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mergers, recent Delaware case law facilitates a new mechanism -freezeout via tender offer-by
eliminating entire fairness review for these transactions. This Article identifies two social welfare
costs of the current doctrinal regime. First, the tender-offer-freezeout mechanism facilitates
some inefficient (value-destroying) transactions by allowing the controller to exploit asymmetric
information against the minority. Second, the merger-freezeout mechanism deters some efficient
(value-increasing) transactions because of the special committee's veto power against the deal.
These negative wealth effects are unlikely to be resolved through private contracting between the
controller and the minority in the corporate charter. Rather than advocating patchwork reforms
to correct these problems, this Article proposes a return to first principles of corporate law in the
freezeout context. The result of this re-grounding would be a convergence in judicial standards
of review for freezeouts and the elimination of the efficiency loss that is inherent in the existing
doctrine.
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On August 2, 2004, Barbara Cox Anthony and Anne Cox Chambers, who
together owned a 62% equity interest and a 73% voting interest in Cox
Communications, announced that they would offer $32 cash per share in a
"freezeout"' of the Cox minority shareholders The offer represented a 16%
premium over the preannouncement trading price for Cox, or $7.9 billion in
total value.3 Cox formed a special committee (SC) of three independent
directors to review the offer and negotiate with the Cox sisters'
representatives. 4 Minority shareholders sued alleging that the offer price was
unfair.s Over the following four months, the SC bargained hard: counter-
offering at $38 per share, walking away from the table at several points, and
finally agreeing to a deal at $34.75 per share, representing a 26% premium over
the pre-offer price.6 The deal closed on December 8, 2oo4. 7
One month later, on January 1o, 2005, News Corporation, controlled by
publishing magnate Rupert Murdoch, announced a freezeout exchange offer
for the 18% of Fox Entertainment Group that it did not already own.8 The
proposed ratio of 1.9 News shares for each Fox share represented a 7.4%
premium over the preannouncement trading price for Fox, or $6.o billion in
total value.9 As in the Cox freezeout, Fox formed an SC of independent
1. A freezeout is a transaction in which a controlling shareholder buys out the minority
shareholders in a publicly traded corporation, for cash or the controller's stock. Freezeouts
are also known, with some occasional loss of precision, as "going private mergers,"
"squeeze-outs," "parent-subsidiary mergers," "minority buyouts," "take outs," or "cash-out
mergers."
2. Press Release, Cox Enters., Inc., Cox Enterprises, Inc. Proposes To Acquire Public Minority
Stake in Cox Communications, Inc. (Aug. 2, 2004), reprinted in Cox Commc'ns Inc., Tender
Offer Statement (Schedule TO-C), at Exhibit 99.1 (Aug. 2, 2004).
3. See id.
4. See Cox Commc'ns, Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement (Schedule 14 D-9), at ii-
12 (Nov. 3, 2004).
5. See In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 613-N, 2005 WL 2001310, at *4
(Del. Ch. June 6, 2005).
6. See Cox Commc'ns, Solicitation/Recommendation Statement, supra note 4, at 5-9.
7. See Cox Commc'ns, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 8, 2004).
S. See Press Release, News Corp., News Corporation Announces Exchange Offer for Publicly
Held Fox Common Stock (Jan. 1o, 2005), reprinted in News Corp., Current Report (Form 8-
K), at Exhibit 99.1 (Jan. 10, 2005).
9. See id.
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directors to review the offer,' and plaintiffs' counsel filed suit alleging that the
offer price was unfair to the minority. However, in contrast to the Cox
freezeout, News stated that it might go forward with the transaction even if the
Fox SC did not approve the offer.' On January 24, the Fox SC issued a
statement taking no position on the News offer, explaining that it needed more
time. 12 On March 4, News raised its offer to 2.04 News shares per Fox share, or
a 17.6% premium over the preannouncement trading price for Fox. 3 On March
7, the SC approved the revised offer,' 4 and the deal closed on March 22, 2005."s
As the Cox Communications and Fox Entertainment Group examples
illustrate, freezeouts are back. Due at least in part to the stock market decline of
2000 and the additional costs imposed on public companies under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,16 freezeout activity in the United States has
increased to more than twice its historical levels: 128 announced transactions in
the four years between July 2001 and July 2005 (32 per year, on average),' 7
compared to 154 freezeouts during the ten years between 1987 and 1996 (15 per
year, on average). 8 At the same time that freezeout activity has been
io. See Fox Entm't Group, Solicitation/Recommendation Statement (Schedule 14D-9), at 9
(Jan. 24, 2005).
ii. See Letter from K. Rupert Murdoch, Chairman and CEO, News Corp., to the Fox Entm't
Group Bd. of Dirs. (Jan. lO, 2005), reprinted in Fox Entm't Group, Inc.,
Solicitation/Recommendation Statement, supra note io, at 8 (stating that "Delaware law
does not require that News Corporation negotiate with the Fox board or reach any
agreement with the Fox board concerning the offer").
12. See Fox Entm't Group, Solicitation/Recommendation Statement, supra note lo, at 9-1o.
13. See News Corp., Tender Offer Statement (Schedule TO), at 5 (Mar. 4, 2005).
14. See Fox Entm't Group, Amendment to Solicitation/Recommendation Statement (Schedule
14 D-9/A), at 7 (Mar. 7, 2005).
1S. See Fox Entm't Group, Solicitation/Recommendation Statement (Schedule 14D-9), at 4
(Mar. 22, 2005).
16. See Deborah Solomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, Companies Complain About Cost of Corporate
Governance Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1O, 2004, at Ai (noting Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs
of between $i and $2 million for larger U.S. public companies). The most recent estimates
suggest even larger costs. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance Cost Estimates Soar 62% Since
January 2oo4, PR NEwsWIRE, Aug. 11, 2004, http://www.pmewswire.com/cgi-
bin/stories.pl ?ACCT=1o4&STORY=/www/story/o8-11-2oo4/ooo222983o&EDATE=
(estimating average compliance costs Of $3.1 million for larger U.S. public companies).
17. See Guhan Subramanian, Freezeouts Database (last updated Aug. 12, 2005) (on file with
author) (compiling data from SEC filings and press releases on deal structure, negotiation
process, and outcomes for all freezeouts of U.S. companies since June 2001).
18. See John C. Coates IV, "Fair Value" as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts
in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1334 (1999). This comparison may slightly
understate the increase in freezeout activity, because the prior study defines freezeouts as
acquisitions by shareholders with 30% or more of the shares, see id. at 1333 n.248, compared
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increasing, the Delaware courts have established different standards of judicial
review for the two ways of freezing out minority shareholders. The traditional
route, known as a statutory merger freezeout, mandates an SC with veto power
over the deal, followed by stringent "entire fairness" review by the courts. The
Cox sisters (or, more accurately, their legal advisors) chose this transactional
form for the Cox Communications freezeout. The new route, known as a
tender offer freezeout, does not give the SC veto power and, at least as of mid-
2001, is subject only to deferential business judgment review by the courts.
News Corporation chose this transactional form for the Fox Entertainment
freezeout.
These procedural differences have substantive implications. Examining the
outcomes of all freezeouts in the current doctrinal regime, I find that minority
shareholders received less in tender offer freezeouts than in merger freezeouts,
as measured by premiums over preannouncement stock prices. 9 This finding
is illustrated dramatically by the Cox and Fox examples above: If the Fox
minority shareholders had received the same 26.0% premium that the Cox
minority shareholders received (rather than their actual 17.6%), they would
have achieved an additional $504 million in total consideration from News
Corporation.
Commentators have debated the wisdom of doctrinal contours that create
procedural and substantive differences based on choice of transactional form,
and several have advocated convergence toward a single judicial approach to
freezeouts.2 ° The need for change has nevertheless remained unclear because of
the possibility for adjustments in ex ante pricing of a minority stake. This
Article makes the case for change by identifying two social welfare costs of the
current regime. First, the tender-offer-freezeout mechanism facilitates some
inefficient (value-destroying) transactions by allowing the controller to exploit
asymmetric information against the minority. Second, the merger-freezeout
mechanism deters some efficient (value-increasing) transactions because of the
SC's power to veto the deal. Tender-offer-freezeout doctrine goes too far, and
merger-freezeout doctrine does not go far enough, in facilitating freezeouts.
Put another way, some companies that should not "go private" do, while others
that should do not. As a result, there is a suboptimal distribution of companies
between public and private status.
to the 35% cutoff used in Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-Outs: Theory & Evidence
(Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Working Paper No. 472, 2oo5),
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-Center/papers/pdf/Subramanian_
472_revised.pdf.
19. See Subramanian, supra note 18, at 48-49 tbl.3. These findings hold for the full sample as
well as the subsample of Delaware targets. See id.
2o. See infra Section I.D.
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After identifying this efficiency loss, this Article proposes specific doctrinal
adjustments that would fix freezeouts. Rather than propose a patchwork
solution, this Article advocates a return to first principles of corporate law in
the freezeout context. The objective is to replicate the elements of an arms-
length negotiation- namely, disinterested board approval and disinterested
shareholder approval-in the freezeout context. Translating the arms-length
standard to the freezeout arena requires, first, meaningful approval by an SC of
independent directors; and second, approval by a majority of the minority
shareholders. When both of these procedural protections are provided, this
Article proposes that courts should apply deferential business judgment review
to assess the transaction. If either or both of these protections are absent, this
Article proposes that courts should step in to scrutinize the transaction under
the entire fairness standard. The result of this re-grounding would be
convergence in standards of judicial review for freezeouts and elimination of
the efficiency loss inherent in the existing doctrine.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief
history of freezeout doctrine, beginning with the Delaware Supreme Court's
landmark decision Weinberger v. UOP in 1983, and tracing the evolution of this
doctrine through Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Solomon v. Pathe
Communications, and the combination of In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders
Litigation, Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., and In re Pure Resources, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation in 2001-2002. Part I also summarizes the literature to
date examining this latest doctrinal contour and demonstrates that the case for
change has remained unclear. Part II identifies an efficiency loss that arises in
the current doctrinal regime. With the case for change thus clarified, Part III
puts forward my proposal for reform.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Origins ofFreezeouts
Until the 1920S, minority shareholders had a property interest in the
corporation that allowed them to hold out against a controlling shareholder's
efforts to freeze them out.2 While Florida enacted the first cash-out merger
statute in the mid-192os,' freezeouts only became commonplace when
Delaware in the 195os, and the Model Business Corporation Act in the 196os,
21. See Elliott J. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, S6 N.Y.U. L. REV.
624, 627-29 (1981) (citing case law).
22. See id. at 632.
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adopted similar cash-out statutes. 3 These laws provided the statutory merger
mechanism for freezing out minority shareholders, which remains the most
common procedure today. 4 In a merger freezeout, the controlling shareholder
establishes a wholly owned corporation; the target board (typically dominated
by the controller) approves the merger; and the shareholders of the target
(again, dominated by the controller) approve the transaction." Under the
terms of the merger, the minority shareholders receive either cash or the
controller's stock in exchange for their shares in the target. 6 The transaction is
executed as a statutory merger under section 251 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law or analogous provisions in other states.
Delaware courts quickly established that freezeouts would be subject to
judicial review for entire fairness to the minority shareholders.2 7 The
application of entire fairness review to freezeouts was unremarkable, as it is
consistent with the Delaware courts' general approach to self-dealing
transactions. 8 The situation became more interesting in the late 196os and
early 1970s, however, when the level of freezeout activity increased at the same
time that the stock market experienced substantial declines. 9 Concerns
emerged that controlling shareholders were taking advantage of fire-sale prices
to eliminate powerless minority shareholders.3" In a much-publicized speech
given at the University of Notre Dame in November 1974, SEC Commissioner
A.A. Sommer said:
23. See id. at 648.
24. See Subramanian, supra note 18, at 18 (finding that more than two-thirds of freezeouts
between June 20o1 and April 2005 were executed through the statutory merger route).
25. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 1109-
lO (8th ed. 2000) (describing the mechanics of statutory merger freezeouts and noting other
techniques that, until twenty-five years ago, had "met with only indifferent success at the
hands of the courts").
26. Cf. id. (noting that minority shareholders can also receive debt or redeemable preferred
stock in the freezeout). I found that all freezeouts between June 20oi and April 2005 have
offered either cash or common stock to the minority. See Subramanian, supra note 17.
27. See, e.g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952); Gottlieb v. Heyden
Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57 (Del. 1952).
28. See DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., 1 THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 282-88 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing conflict transactions).
29. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 465 (2003).
30. See, e.g., Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570, 573 (Del. Ch. 1976) (describing a
freezeout transaction by the controller in September 1974, "when the market price of
TransOcean stock was abnormally depressed due to general unhealthy economic
conditions"), rev'd on other grounds, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977).
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Daily we read of companies which are offering to buy out all, or
substantially all, of their shareholders, thus enhancing the control of
the controlling shareholders and freeing the corporation of the
"burdens" of being publicly-held. In other instances clever and indeed
most imaginative devices are used to afford the small shareholders
litde, if any, choice in the matter. What is happening is, in my
estimation, serious, unfair, and sometimes disgraceful, a perversion of
the whole process of public financing, and a course that inevitably is
going to make the individual shareholder even more hostile to
American corporate mores and the securities markets than he already
is. 1
The SEC responded to the perceived problem with the promulgation of
Rule 13e-3 in 1979.32 Under this Rule, a controlling shareholder must make
extensive disclosures to the minority in conjunction with a freezeout
transaction- including the purpose of the transaction (and why alternative
methods for achieving the same purpose were rejected) ,3 a summary of the
investment banker's fairness opinion,34 and financial information such as
current and historical market prices3 - in order to facilitate an informed
decision by minority shareholders.
While the SEC focused on disclosure, the Delaware courts, in a more
gradual movement, established procedural protections for minority
shareholders. I will now examine the evolution of this case law, which took
place during the 198os and 199os.
31. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Comm'r, SEC, Law Advisory Council Lecture, Notre Dame Law School
(Nov. 1974), in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 8O,oio, at 84,695
(Nov. 20, 1974); see also Arthur M. Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?,
49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 987, 987 (1974) ("A recent spate of attempts by public companies to
rejoin the private sector has become, in less than one year, perhaps the most discussed topic
in corporate law. News media, cases and the SEC have all become suddenly conscious of this
unexpected offspring of an uncertain economy.").
32. See SEC Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 24o.13e-3 (2005).
33. See SEC Schedule 13e-3, Item 7, 17 C.F.R. § 24o.13e-1oo (2oo5) (referencing Item 1013 of
Regulation M-A, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1013 (2005)).
34. See id. at Item 9 (referencing Item lO15 of Regulation M-A, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1o15 (2005)).
35. See id. at Item 8 (referencing Item 1014 of Regulation M-A, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1014 (2005)).
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B. Development of Procedural Protections
1. Weinberger v. UOP
The seminal case on freezeouts in the modern era is Weinberger v. UOP,3
6
handed down by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1983. Weinberger involved a
freezeout of UOP's minority shareholders by its 50.5% shareholder, Signal
Companies. Minority shareholders brought suit alleging that the price paid,
$21 per share in cash, was not fair to them. The Delaware Chancery Court held
for the defendant directors, who were affiliated with both UOP and Signal.3"
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, finding that the deal process did not
meet the entire fairness standard, and remanded the case to the chancery court
for an inquiry into the fair value of the minority shares.
3s
While Weinberger did several notable things,3 9 for present purposes its
most important contribution was the identification of the procedural
protections that minority shareholders should receive in freezeout mergers.
The Court began by noting that entire fairness review required both "fair
dealing" and "fair price," and clarified what each of these entailed:
[Fair dealing] embraces questions of when the transaction was timed,
how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors,
and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were
obtained. [Fair price] relates to the economic and financial
considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors
.... However, the test for fairness is not a bifircated one as between
fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be examined as a
whole since the question is one of entire fairness.4"
In assessing the transaction at hand, the court found several aspects
problematic under this standard. First, the court criticized the fact that a
valuation report prepared by two officers of Signal, who were also directors of
UOP, was shared only with the Signal board and not with UOP.41 This report
36. 4 57A.2d 7 01 (Del. 1983).
37. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
38. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715.
39. For example, in Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court replaced the antiquated
"Delaware block" method for valuing shares with "any techniques or methods which are
generally considered acceptable in the financial community." Id. at 712-13.
40. Id. at 711 (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 708-09.
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was "of obvious significance to both Signal and UOP" 42 because it indicated
that any price up to $24 per share (14% higher than the $21 per share that was
actually paid) would have been a good investment for Signal. Second, the court
noted the casualness of the fairness opinion rendered by Lehman Brothers to
the UOP board.43 Among other deficiencies, the Lehman partner seemed to
have reviewed the opinion only on the flight to the UOP board meeting, and,
even at this late stage, the actual price being assessed by Lehman had been left
blank.44 Finally, the Court criticized James Crawford, President and CEO of
UOP, for failing to negotiate in response to Signal's first offer of $21." s
But in the midst of its litany of criticisms of Signal's freezeout process, the
Weinberger court paused to provide crucial guidance for transactional lawyers.
In a much-noticed footnote, the court stated:
Although perfection is not possible, or expected, the result here could
have been entirely different if UOP had appointed an independent
negotiating committee of its outside directors to deal with Signal at
arm's length. Since fairness in this context can be equated to conduct by
a theoretical, wholly independent, board of directors acting upon the
matter before them, it is unfortunate that this course apparently was
neither considered nor pursued. Particularly in a parent-subsidiary
context, a showing that the action taken was as though each of the
contending parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power against the
other at arm's length is strong evidence that the transaction meets the
test of fairness.
46
Transactional lawyers took the hint: An SC of independent directors quickly
became standard practice in freezeout mergers.
47
Two opposing concerns developed in response to the Weinberger SC
mechanism. The first, voiced primarily by judges and academics, is that an SC
42. Id. at 708.
43. Id. at 707.
44- Id.
45. Id. at 711 ("Crawford, Signal's man at UOP, never really talked price with Signal, except to
accede to its management's statements on the subject, and to convey to Signal the UOP
outside directors' view that as between the $2o-$21 range under consideration, it would
have to be $21. The latter is not a surprising outcome, but hardly arm's length
negotiations.").
46. Id. at 709 n.7 (citations omitted).
47. See Donald J. Wolfe, Jr., & Janine M. Salomone, Pure Resources, Printcafe and the
Pugnacious Special Committee, M&A LAw., May 2003, at io, lo ("Since (Weinberger], the use
of special negotiating committees has become commonplace....").
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can never be truly independent from the controlling shareholder because the
controller is an "8oo-pound gorilla" 48 who inevitably will dominate the
independent directors.49 Among those who hold this view, some (generally
academics) conclude that SCs should not warrant significant deference from
the courts as suggested by Weinberger,"° while others (generally judges)
conclude that, even if soft ties exist between the controller and the SC, at least
some judicial deference to an SC process is warranted because courts are not
well-positioned to assess questions of value.51
The second concern, diametrically opposite from the first and voiced
primarily by practitioners, is that SCs are too independent from the controller.
As described by Charles Nathan, global co-chair of the mergers and
acquisitions group at Latham & Watkins: "There are a number of times the
committee turns down perfectly fine deals, or drags things out for months,
because they can't get their act together. And it's a very, very frustrating
experience." 52 Under this view, the Weinberger SC roadmap actually works to
the detriment of minority shareholders by allowing independent directors with
imperfect incentives to veto Pareto-improving transactions.
2. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems
In the years following Weinberger, these opposing views on the wisdom and
efficacy of SCs, invoking fundamental questions of human nature and
organizational behavior, manifested themselves in the Delaware courts as a
narrow, but crucial, legal question: What level of deference should courts
afford to a freezeout merger that was approved by an SC of independent
directors? Footnote 7 of Weinberger was vague on this critical question. In the
48. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of
Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 509 (2002) ("[T]his strain of thought was premised on
the notion that when an 8oo-pound gorilla wants the rest of the bananas, little chimpanzees,
like independent directors and minority stockholders, cannot be expected to stand in the
way, even if the gorilla putatively gives them veto power.").
49. See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) ("Entire fairness remains
applicable even when an independent committee is utilized because the underlying factors
which raise the specter of impropriety can never be completely eradicated and still require
careful judicial scrutiny."); William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of
Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAw. 1287, 1308 (2001) (noting that
outside directors "are not hermetically sealed offfrom the inside directors").
So. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate Law, 13 J. CoRP. L.
997, 1002-03 (1988).
S. See, e.g., ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 29, at 312; Allen et al., supra note 49, at 13o6-07.
52. Telephone Interview with Charles Nathan, Global Co-Chair of Mergers and Acquisitions,
Latham & Watkins LLP (Feb. 20, 2004).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
absence of guidance, judges on the Delaware Chancery Court divided in their
approaches in the late 198os and early 199os. In In re Trans World Airlines, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation, for example, Chancellor Bill Allen held that SC approval
changed the standard of review for a freezeout merger from entire fairness to
highly deferential business judgment review."3 In contrast, in Citron v. E.L Du
Pont de Nemours & Co. 4 and Rabkin v. Olin Corp.," Vice Chancellors Jack
Jacobs and Bill Chandler, respectively, held that SC approval only shifted the
burden on entire fairness review from the defendant to the plaintiff.
These competing approaches were reconciled by the Delaware Supreme
Court eleven years after Weinberger in Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems. 
6
Lynch involved a freezeout of the minority shareholders in Lynch
Communications by Lynch's controlling shareholder, Alcatel. Following the
Weinberger roadmap, the Lynch board established an SC of independent
directors to negotiate with Alcatel.57 Unlike the UOP representatives in
Weinberger, the Lynch SC was not spineless: Alcatel proposed $14 per share in
cash; the Lynch SC counter-offered $17; Alcatel responded with offers of $15,
$15.25, and then a "final offer" of $15.5o, all rejected by the Lynch SC.,8 To
break the stalemate, Alcatel informed the SC that it was "'ready to proceed with
an unfriendly tender [directly to the minority shareholders] at a lower price' if
the $15.50 per share price was not recommended." 59 In the face of this threat,
the Lynch SC caved and unanimously recommended approval of the $15.50
offer.6°
Minority shareholders in Lynch brought suit seeking entire fairness review.
The chancery court entered judgment for the defendants Alcatel and Lynch
Communications 61 and the plaintiffs appealed. The Delaware Supreme Court
reversed on the grounds that the Lynch SC did not have the "power to say no"
when faced with Alcatel's tender offer threat.62 The court remanded the case to
53. Civ. A. No. 9844, 1988 WL 111271, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988), abrogated by Kahn v. Lynch
Commc'n Sys., 638 A.2d 111o (Del. 1994).
54- 584 A.2d 49o, 504-10 (Del. Ch. 199o).
55. C.A. No. 7547, 199o WL 47648, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 199o), affd, 586 A.2d 1202 (Del.
1990).
56. 638 A.2d 111o (Del. 1994).




61. Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Civ. A. No. 8748, 1993 VL 290193 (Del. Ch. July 9, 1993),
rev'd, 638 A.2d 111o (Del. 1994).
62. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1119-20.
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the Delaware Chancery Court with the burden on the defendants to
demonstrate the entire fairness of the transaction.6 3
One of the interesting features in Lynch is that Alcatel did not threaten to
execute a statutory merger unilaterally -which it had the legal ability to do
because it controlled Lynch's board -but only threatened to go directly to the
minority shareholders through a tender offer. Because Alcatel held only 43% of
the Lynch shares, it would have needed 83% support from the minority
shareholders (47% out of the remaining 57%) to achieve the 90% control that
would then have allowed a short-form back-end merger.64 Therefore, Alcatel's
"threat" was nothing more than an invocation of Alcatel's otherwise legal walk-
away alternative, in which Alcatel would have had to achieve overwhelming
support from the minority in order to be successful. The Lynch court ignored
this point, making clear the extent to which a controller must behave nicely in
its negotiations with the SC.
And what exactly does the controller get from behaving nicely? Here too
the Lynch court provided an unsatisfying answer from the controller's
perspective. Lynch resolved the two strands of Delaware Chancery Court cases
noted above by holding that even a pristine SC process only shifts the burden
of proof to the plaintiff on entire fairness review. 61 Thus, Lynch implicitly
endorses the view that independent directors cannot be truly independent from
the controlling shareholder, and that courts still need to scrutinize freezeout
transactions for entire fairness because of the inability to replicate an arms-
length process between the controlling shareholder and the SC.
3. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil
One could argue that while an SC may be captured by the controller, the
minority shareholders cannot be, and therefore greater judicial deference
should be afforded to approval by a majority of the minority shareholders (a
63. On remand, the Delaware Chancery Court found that the defendants had met their burden
to show entire fairness. Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Civ. A. No. 8748, 1995 WL 301403, at
*3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1995). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. Kahn v. Lynch
Commc'n Sys., 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995). This result demonstrated that entire fairness
review would not be outcome determinative. Thus, on remand, the chancery court left the
bar high by not relinquishing entire fairness review, but the Supreme Court subsequently
made clear that this bar was not insurmountable. See Jesse A. Finkelstein, Special Committees,
Entire Fairness, and Kahn v. Lynch Communications, INSIGHTS, Mar. 1996, at 2, 5.
64. See infra text accompanying note 76. Because Alcatel held less than 50% of the shares, the
court needed to determine whether it was a controlling shareholder, and concluded that it
was. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1114-15.
65. See id. at 1120-21.
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"MOM condition").66 Whatever appeal this argument may have as a matter of
logic, the Delaware courts have rejected it, choosing instead to afford only
minimal deference to MOM conditions. The seminal case on this point is
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co.,67 handed down by the Delaware Supreme Court just
two years after Weinberger. Rosenblatt involved the 1976 freezeout of the
minority shareholders in Skelly Oil Company, which was 8o% owned (directly
and through a subsidiary) by Getty Oil. 68 In this deal, extensive negotiations
took place between Harold Berg, Getty's Chief Operating Officer, and James
Hara, President of Skelly. Because the deal was a pre-Weinberger transaction,
before the benefits of the SC route were made clear, Skelly did not form an SC,
even though Skelly had several independent directors on its board. Berg and
Hara agreed to an exchange ratio of 0.5875 Getty shares for each Skelly share.6"
The Skelly board approved the deal and submitted it to a shareholder vote.
Although the deal did not expressly contain a MOM condition, 89% of the
voting Skelly minority shares, representing 58% of all minority shares,
approved the transaction.
70
The deal closed, and minority shareholders brought a fairness claim in the
Delaware Chancery Court. The chancery court found the deal to be fair to the
minority shareholders, and the plaintiffs appealed. In affirming the chancery
court, the Delaware Supreme Court held that approval by the minority
shareholders shifted the burden on entire fairness to the plaintiff but did not
shift the standard of review to business judgment.7' This case, like Lynch nine
years later, illustrates the Delaware Supreme Court's unwillingness to
relinquish entire fairness review regardless of the procedural protections that
the controller provides.
Today, one puzzling (if unintended) consequence of the Rosenblatt and
Lynch combination is that either SC approval or a MOM condition shifts the
burden on entire fairness review, but the combination of the two procedural
protections provides no further benefit to the controlling shareholder in terms
of standards of judicial review. Empirically, the vast majority of controllers in
my sample of post-Siliconix merger freezeouts (eighty out of eighty-five, or
94%) went through an SC process.72 With the burden thus shifted through a
well-functioning SC, controllers have no further incentive to provide a MOM
66. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 49, at 1307-o8 (proposing such an approach).
67. 4 93 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985).
68. Id. at 931.
69. Id. at 936.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 937.
72. See Subramanian, supra note 18, at 44 fig.i.
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condition. Consistent with this prediction, I find that only one-third (eighteen
out of fifty-five) of the merger freezeouts in my sample included a MOM
condition.
73
To summarize, while Weinberger provides the procedural roadmap for
freezeout transactions, Lynch limits the benefits of this route by requiring a
"Caesar's wife" SC process, and Lynch and Rosenblatt together hold that even
an SC/MOM combination does not eliminate entire fairness review. From a
transactional lawyer's perspective, merger-freezeout doctrine after Lynch and
Rosenblatt represents the worst of all possible worlds: a fully empowered SC
and a feisty negotiation with the controller, to be followed nevertheless with
entire fairness review by the court, even if minority shareholders have
approved the deal. 74 Of course, the potential beneficiaries of this approach are
the minority shareholders, who should gain from both the procedural
protections that Weinberger encourages and the judicial scrutiny that Lynch and
Rosenblatt mandate.
In effect, the Weinberger-to-Rosenblatt-to-Lynch trajectory represents the
Delaware courts' gradual approach to the problem of inadequate minority
shareholder protections that presented itself in the 1970s. This gradual
trajectory would be disrupted by the Siliconix and Glassman combination in
2001. I now turn to this latest doctrinal contour.
C. Disruptive Technology: The Tender Offer Freezeout
A statutory merger is not the only way to execute a freezeout; it can also be
executed through a reverse stock split or an asset acquisition, though these
methods are rare in practice.75 Another method that began to appear in the
199os was a freezeout via tender offer. In this route, the controlling
shareholder would begin, or announce its intention to begin, a tender offer
directly to the minority shareholders. The target would form an SC of
independent directors to assess the transaction, negotiate with the controller,
and issue a Schedule 14D-9 recommendation to the minority (e.g., approve,
reject, neutral, or unable to take a position). If the controller gained sufficient
73. See id.
74. Cf Donald J. Wolfe, Jr., The Odd Couple: Majority of Minority Approval and the Tender Offer,
M&A LAW., Nov./Dec. 2002, at 6, 8 ("Delaware law now seems to require that the
committee be fully empowered to represent the interests of the minority actively in
connection with the structuring and pricing of the deal .... Any less than this is highly
likely to result in a judicial refusal to afford the committee process any of the hoped-for
cleansing effect on the otherwise interested transaction.").
75. See Subramanian, supra note 18, at 15-16 (noting that 2 out of 121 post-Siliconix freezeouts
were executed as reverse stock splits rather than as statutory mergers or tender offers).
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shares in its tender offer to get to 90% voting control of the target, it would
then execute a short-form merger, which does not require a shareholder vote,
in order to eliminate the remaining (nontendering) minority shareholders."6
Because 90% is the critical threshold in a tender offer freezeout, the controller
would typically condition its offer on getting to 90% control (a "90%
condition").
i. Solomon v. Pathe Communications
Historically, practitioners assumed that tender offer freezeouts would also
be subject to entire fairness review, because they achieved the same end result
as merger freezeouts, namely, the elimination of the minority shareholders.
77
As a result there was no obvious benefit to be gained from a tender offer
freezeout, and the merger form continued to dominate in practice. This
calculus began to change in the mid-199os with the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp.7s The Solomon court
affirmed a chancery court holding that a tender offer by a controlling
shareholder to the minority was not subject to entire fairness review.79 The
court reasoned that a tender offer was a deal between the controlling
shareholder and minority shareholders, which involved no conflict of
interest. s
Because the tender offer was for less than all the minority shares, Solomon
was not a freezeout situation, and could easily have been limited to its facts.8 '
Practitioners nevertheless read the tea leaves of Solomon to suggest that a
76. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2oo1 & Supp. 2004); see also MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT § 11.04
(1983).
77. See Bradley R. Aronstam et al., Delaware's Going-Private Dilemma: Fostering Protections for
Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Exploration, S8 Bus. LAW. 519, 520
(2003). While Lynch v. Vickers Energy CorT., 351 A.2d 570 (Del. Ch. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977), declined to apply entire fairness review to a tender offer
freezeout, it was not clear that this decision survived Weinberger, nine years later.
78. 672A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
79. See id. at 39.
8o. See id. at 39-40 ("In the case of totally voluntary tender offers, as here, courts do not impose
any right of the shareholders to receive a particular price.... [I]n the absence of coercion or
disclosure violations, the adequacy of the price in a voluntary tender offer cannot be an
issue.") (citations omitted).
81. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 785, 818 n.122 (2003) (noting a potential narrow reading of Solomon).
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tender offer freezeout might not be subject to entire fairness review.82 But even
if this interpretation were correct, it was not clear that a controlling
shareholder could avoid entire fairness review in the back-end short-form
merger that would be necessary to complete the freezeout.8" As a result of this
doctrinal uncertainty, practitioners continued to stay away from tender offer
freezeouts in favor of the traditional merger route.
2. In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation
The test case on the front-end tender offer came five years after Solomon, in
In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation.84  Siliconix involved Vishay
Intertechnology's freezeout of the minority shareholders in Siliconix. Vishay,
which owned 80.4% of Siliconix, announced a tender offer for the minority
shares at $28.82 cash per share.8 s With Vishay's encouragement, Siliconix
appointed an SC of two independent directors to negotiate with Vishay.86 The
SC hired legal and financial advisors and concluded that the offer price was
inadequate. 7 After three months of negotiations, Vishay switched from a cash
tender offer to a stock exchange offer at a ratio of 1.5 Vishay shares for every
Siliconix share.88 Minority shareholders brought suit alleging that the
exchange ratio being offered was unfair. Citing Solomon, among other cases,
the Delaware Chancery Court declined to apply entire fairness review to the
tender offer freezeout: "Because... there were no disclosure violations and the
tender is not coercive, Vishay was not obligated to offer a fair price in its
tender."89
8z. An unpublished opinion two years after Solomon and three years before Siliconix
foreshadowed that these tea leaves were correct. See In re Life Tech., Inc. S'holders Litig.,
No. C-A. 16513, 1998 WL 181228o (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 1998).
83. See In re Pure Res., Inc. S'holders Litig., 8o8 A.2d 421, 437 (Del. Ch. 2002) (explaining the
uncertainty that existed in the mid-199os regarding whether entire fairness would apply).
84. No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001).
85. Id. at *1-2.
86. Id. at *2.
87. Id. at *3-
88. Id. at *3-4.
89. Id. at *6. As defenders of the decision point out, Vishay did not receive sufficient tenders to
meet its MOM condition, thus calling into question whether its offer might have been
"coercive" to the minority. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders:
The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price, 1 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 83, 101 (2004); Strine, supra note
48, at 512-13. In March 2005, Vishay announced a new exchange offer for the 20% of
Siliconix that it did not hold. See Press Release, Siliconix, Inc., Siliconix Announces
Engagement of Lehman Brothers Inc. and Heller Ehrman LLP To Assist Siliconix Special
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3. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration
Just one month after Siliconix, the Delaware Supreme Court provided an
answer on the remaining piece, the back-end short-form merger. In Glassman
v. Unocal Exploration Corp.,"° handed down in July 2001, the parent company
Unocal Corporation (Unocal) owned 96% of its subsidiary Unocal Exploration
Corporation (UXC).9' Unocal decided to freeze out the minority shareholders,
and UXC appointed an SC of three directors to negotiate the terms of the
deal. 92 The parties negotiated an exchange ratio of 0.54 Unocal shares for each
UXC share, and, because Unocal held more than 90% of UXC, the freezeout
was executed as a short-form merger under section 253 of the Delaware
corporate code. 93
Minority shareholders brought suit alleging that the transaction was unfair.
The Delaware Chancery Court declined to apply entire fairness review and
dismissed the claim. 94 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
"absent fraud or illegality, appraisal is the exclusive remedy available to a
minority shareholder who objects to a short-form merger."95 The court
reasoned that section 253 was intended to provide a streamlined process for
accomplishing a merger, which is squarely at odds with the procedural
apparatus that the fair process prong of entire fairness requires: "If... the
corporate fiduciary sets up negotiating committees, hires independent financial
and legal experts, etc., then it will have lost the very benefit provided by the
statute - a simple, fast and inexpensive process for accomplishing a merger.,96
Thus, with Glassman, the other shoe had dropped, and practitioners now
had a blueprint for avoiding entire fairness review in a freezeout transaction.
Under Siliconix, a tender offer to the minority would be exempt from entire
Committee in Evaluating Vishay Tender Offer (Mar. 24, 2005), reprinted in Siliconix, Inc.,
Current Report (Form 8-K), at Exhibit 99 (Mar. 24, 2005). This time, the offer was
successfil, more than four years after Vishay began its effort to take its 8o% subsidiary
private. See Press Release, Vishay Int'l, Vishay Announces Successful Completion of
Siliconix Tender Offer (May 12, 2005), reprinted in Vishay Intertechnology, Inc., Current
Report (Form 8-K), at Exhibit 99 (May 13, 2005). The deal closed on May 17, 2005.
777 A.2d 24 2 (Del. 2001).
91. Id. at 243.
92. Id.
Id. at 243-44.
In re Unocal Exploration Corp. S'holders Litig., 79 3 A.2d 329 (Del. Ch. 2000), affid sub nom.
Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp. (In re Unocal Exploration Corp. S'holders Litig.),
7 7 7 A.2d 24 2 (Del. 2001).
Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248.
Id. at 247-48.






fairness review, and if the controller got to 90% voting control, the back-end
short-form merger would also be exempt under Glassman. Practitioners, 97
academics, 9 ' and judges99 quickly noted the disparity in judicial treatment
between tender offer freezeouts and merger freezeouts. At the same time that
Lynch refused to abandon entire fairness review, even with a well-functioning
SC process, Siliconix/Glassman readily deferred to the unilateral action of the
controlling shareholder. The result was dramatically different standards of
review for two functionally identical transactional forms.
4. In re Pure Resources
In re Pure Resources Shareholder Litigation,°° the most recent doctrinal
development on freezeouts, begins to address this disparity. Pure Resources
involved Unocal Exploration (again) tendering for the 35% of Pure Resources
that it did not own. Minority shareholders (again) brought suit alleging
unfairness. After an extensive discussion of the "two strands of authority that
answer these questions differently,"1"' Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, following
Solomon, declined to apply entire fairness review to Unocal's freezeout tender
offer.'0 2 However, in a clear effort to close some of the gap between the two
doctrinal strands, Vice Chancellor Strine noted that the Solomon exemption
from entire fairness review only applied to tender offers that were noncoercive
to the minority. °3 The court seized on this qualification to establish three
procedural conditions that must be met in order for a tender offer to be
noncoercive: (1) the offer must be subject to a nonwaivable MOM condition;
97. See, e.g., Aronstam et al., supra note 77; Jesse A. Finkelstein, Recent Delaware Court Decisions
Show Path To Avoid Entire Fairness Review in Subsidiary Buy-Out Transactions, 33 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 1151 (2001); Charles Nathan & David Schwartzbaum, Latham & Watkins
LLP, Client Presentation: Going Private Via Unilateral Tender Offer (2002) (on file with
author).
98. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 81, at 817-27; Pritchard, supra note 89, at 83.
99. See, e.g., In re Pure Res., Inc. S'holders Litig., 8o8 A.2d 421, 443 (Del. Ch. 2002) ("I admit
being troubled by the imbalance in Delaware law exposed by the Solomon/Lynch lines of
cases."); In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *7 (Del.
Ch. June 19, 2OOl) ("It may seem strange that the scrutiny given to tender offer transactions
is less than the scrutiny that may be given to, for example, a merger transaction .....
mo. 8o8 A.2d 421.
iol. Id. at 435.
102. Id. at 443-44.
103. See Solomon v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 40 (Del. 1996) ("[I]n the absence of
coercion or disclosure violations, the adequacy of the price in a voluntary tender offer cannot
be an issue.").
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(2) the controller must guarantee to consummate a prompt short-form merger
at the same price if it obtains 90% or more of the shares; and (3) the controller
must make no "retributive threats" in its negotiations with the SC.'0 4 The Pure
Resources court confirmed, however, that if these conditions were met then a
tender offer freezeout would not be subject to entire fairness review.
5. Synthesis
To summarize, Delaware law currently offers a controlling shareholder two
transactional forms for a freezeout: the statutory merger route and the tender
offer route. These two forms appear similar at the outset. In each case the
process begins when the controller informs the target board of its intention to
freeze out the minority, and the target board responds by establishing an SC of
independent directors. But at this point the similarity disappears. While the SC
in a merger freezeout has veto power over the transaction and in theory can
negotiate indefinitely, the SC in a tender offer freezeout cannot veto the
transaction and has only ten days to issue its 14 D-9 recommendation to the
minority. The difference continues in the standard of judicial review imposed:
entire fairness review for merger freezeouts compared to business judgment
review for tender offer freezeouts. Perhaps not surprisingly in view of this
procedural divergence, the substantive outcomes differ significantly as well:
Controlling shareholders pay less to the minority, on average, in tender offer
freezeouts than in merger freezeouts.105 I now review the academic and
practitioner commentary that has developed in response to this state of play.
D. Prior Literature
Commentators have divided on the Weinberger-to-Pure Resources line of
cases. These responses can be divided into three categories: those who advocate
convergence in standards of judicial review by subjecting tender offer
freezeouts to entire fairness review; those who defend the status quo; and
io4. See In re Pure Res., 8o8 A.ad at 445. In a companion paper I report that these conditions were
present in most tender offer freezeouts even before Pure Resources. See Subramanian, supra
note 18, at 48 tbl.2; see also Christopher A. Iacono, Comment, Tender Offers and Short-Form
Mergers by Controlling Shareholders Under Delaware Law: The "8oo-Pound Gorilla" Continues
Unimpeded-In re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 28 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 645,
668-69 (2003) ("The court's requirement that tender offers contain these three prerequisites
will have little practical effect. This is because most recent tender offer/short-form merger
transactions have already been structured to include these requirements." (footnote
omitted)).
1o5. See Subramanian, supra note 18, at 48 tbl. 3.
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those who propose hybrid approaches. This Section summarizes and assesses
each of these positions in turn.
i. Advocating Entire Fairness Review for Tender Offer Freezeouts
At one end of the spectrum, some commentators argue for doctrinal
convergence through entire fairness review for tender offer freezeouts on the
grounds of doctrinal coherence.1" 6 Although this simple solution has some
superficial appeal, there are two problems with it. First, it does not take into
account the costs of judicial intervention. Because courts are not well
positioned to engage in the difficult task of valuation, entire fairness review
should be deployed sparingly. In fact, part of the explanation for the dramatic
doctrinal gap between Lynch (a Delaware Supreme Court decision) and
Siliconix (a Delaware chancery court decision) may be the fact that chancery
judges "personally face the daunting task of valuation" and, therefore, may be
"institutionally inclined to avoid it wherever they can do so responsibly."' 7
This aspect of judicial realism suggests that the simple solution of applying
entire fairness review may not adequately account for institutional realities and
may introduce judicial costs that outweigh the benefits of doctrinal
convergence.
Second, and more importantly, entire fairness review for all freezeouts does
not necessarily follow from the general argument in favor of doctrinal
convergence. The argument for convergence "up" focuses on providing
adequate procedural protections to minority shareholders, but an important
counterargument is that entire fairness review for all freezeouts may deter
some value-creating transactions. In an important article published just before
Siliconix, two sitting Vice-Chancellors and a former Chancellor proposed
convergence "down" to business judgment review for all freezeouts that
received SC approval, in effect proposing a reconsideration of the rule in
1o6. See, e.g., Ely R. Levy, Freeze-out Transactions the Pure Way: Reconciling Judicial Asymmetry
Between Tender Offers and Negotiated Mergers, 1o6 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (2004); Brian M.
Resnick, Note, Recent Delaware Decisions May Prove To Be "Entirely Unfair" to Minority
Shareholders in Parent Merger with Partially Owned Subsidiary, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 253
(2003); see also Kimble Charles Cannon, Augmenting the Duties of Directors To Protect
Minority Shareholders in the Context of Going-Private Transactions: The Case for Obligating
Directors To Express a Valuation Opinion in Unilateral Tender Offers After Siliconix, Aquila,
and Pure Resources, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 191 (2003) (proposing entire fairness review
for tender offers in addition to possible amendments to the Delaware corporate code or
federal intervention).
107. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 29, at 312.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Lynch.1" 8 The question of convergence "up" or convergence "down" cannot be
resolved on a theoretical level. But at the very least it is clear that arguments for
convergence only invite the larger question of convergence to what.
Commentators who support entire fairness review for all freezeouts do not
adequately address this issue.
2. Defending the Status Quo
A second group of commentators defend the doctrinal contour that
Siliconix and Glassman establish.0 9 These commentators put forward three
arguments in support of this view. The first is formalistic: Delaware corporate
law provides an important role for a target board in a statutory merger but no
role for the board in a tender offer. Therefore, judicial scrutiny of a tender offer
is not warranted because there is no corporate action. This argument was
central to the court's reasoning in Siliconix: "[T]ender offers essentially
represent the sale of shareholders' separate property and such sales-even
when aggregated into a single change in control transaction- require no
'corporate' action and do not involve distinctively 'corporate' interests."'10
The problem with this argument, as noted by academics.. and even other
chancery court judges, 2 is that it ignores one of the most important strands of
Delaware corporate law of the past twenty years, which is precisely about
articulating the board's role in a tender offer: the degree to which a target
board may adopt defensive measures against a hostile tender offer. 3 Thus, this
argument creates a tension, if not outright contradiction, between the board's
10s. See Allen et al., supra note 49, at 13o6-o9.
log. See, e.g., Jon E. Abramczyk et al., Going-Private "Dilemma"?-Not in Delaware, 58 Bus. LAw.
1351 (2003); Pritchard, supra note 89.
no. In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 20O1 WL 716787, at *7 (Del. Ch. June
19, 2001).
iii. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 81, at 820-21.
112. See In re Pure Res., Inc. S'holders Litig., 8o8 A.2d 421, 441 (Del. Ch. 2002) ("Because tender
offers are not treated exceptionally in the third-party context, it is important to ask why the
tender offer method should be consequential in formulating the equitable standards of
fiduciary conduct by which courts review acquisition proposals made by controlling
stockholders.").
113. The list is well known to students of Delaware corporate law; the most important in this
line of cases are Unitrin v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); Paramount
Communications v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 199o); Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d
651 (Del. Ch. 1988); and Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). See
generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 887, 940-
44 (2002) (summarizing the evolution of this doctrine).
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role in freezeout tender offers (none) and the board's role in hostile tender
offers (substantial). If the distinguishing feature is the nature of the bidder
(controlling shareholder versus hostile bidder), then it would seem that
minority shareholders should receive more protection in the freezeout case,
rather than less, because in a freezeout there is no market check on the bidder's
actions."
4
A second argument made by proponents of the status quo is that minority
shareholders have adequate protection from coercive or inadequate tender
offers from their tender decision itself."I Again, this theory was offered as part
of the rationale in Siliconix: "[A]s long as the tender offer is pursued properly,
the free choice of the minority shareholders to reject the tender offer provides
sufficient protection.""16 The problem with this argument is that it is
inconsistent with my empirical evidence, which shows that minority
shareholders receive less in tender offer freezeouts than in merger freezeouts.
This finding is further supported by practitioner impressions that the binary
choice of a tender decision is not a substitute for vigorous bargaining by an SC.
As described by Jim Morphy, head of the mergers and acquisitions practice at
Sullivan & Cromwell in New York City:
In a tender offer the controlling stockholder, in effect, says to the other
stockholders, "Here is my offer: the stock was trading at $6.25, I'm
willing to pay you $8.oo. That's your choice-you can have $8.oo or
you can have $6.25." Because it is difficult for stockholders, as a group,
to bargain collectively, the tendency if you are a stockholder is to take
the $8.00. Someone might have a mathematical analysis of how this all
works but that is essentially what takes place in the absence of an
effective bargaining agent like a special committee. In the merger
scenario, given the difference in statutory and legal standards, the
special committee is not as easily by-passed by the controlling
stockholder. Therefore its choice is not between $6.25 and $8.oo.
114. See In re Pure Res., 8o8 A.2d at 441-42.
115. See, e.g., Abramczyk et al., supra note 1o9; Pritchard, supra note 89, at 1Ol-O3; cf. Thomas M.
McElroy, II, Note, In re Pure Resources: Providing Certainty to Attorneys Structuring Going-
Private Transactions, or Not?, 39 WAKE FoR.EsT L. REV. 539, 555 (2oo4) (arguing that
procedural protections introduced by Pure Resources make the merger-freezeout and tender-
offer-freezeout processes "more similar").
116. In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *6 (Del. Ch. June
19, 2001).
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Armed with information and sufficient authority, it can go out and
negotiate for something better.
1 7
In short, both empirical evidence and practitioner impressions reject the view
that minority shareholders have adequate protections in freezeout tender
offers, at least as measured against the benchmark of the freezeout merger
process.
The final argument put forward in defense of the status quo is less easily
dismissed. In a standard, yet important, law-and-economics move, Adam
Pritchard points out that the arrival of tender offer freezeouts will, at most,
create a one-time wealth transfer from minority shareholders to the
controller."" Going forward, minority shareholders will simply pay less for a
minority stake knowing that they may get frozen out at a lower price sometime
in the future. Therefore, from an ex ante perspective, Siliconix does not
influence the distribution of gains between minority shareholders and the
controller; by extension, Siliconix will have no effect on allocational efficiency.
This is a simple but powerful argument, one that commentators in favor of
doctrinal convergence have not addressed. Nevertheless, there are some
problems with it. Pritchard overstates the simplicity of the ex ante calculation
by assuming that all, or virtually all, practitioners have shifted to the tender
offer mechanism for freezing out minority shareholders in the aftermath of
Siliconix and Glassman. Indeed, this assumption has found strong support
among academics, 9 practitioner-oriented journals, 2 ' and even practitioners
117. Jim Morphy, Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell, Remarks at Harvard Law School Panel
Discussion on Freezeouts (Apr. 9, 2004).
118. See Pritchard, supra note 89, at 1o3; see also ROBERT CHARLEs CLARK, CORPORATE LAW S 12.2,
at 506 (1986) ("[O]nce the power of a controlling group to freeze out other shareholders
becomes clearly established by case law or statute and the governing rules become widely
known, shareholders can't raise the defeated-expectations argument anymore.").
tig. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 81, at 805 ("[W]hen rules governing one or another
alternative get out of line, transaction planners are quick to adjust their strategies to
compensate, such that the Delaware Chancery Court sees the implications of its previous
decisions quickly and is promptly given the opportunity to adjust the rules and restore
balance.").
120. See David Marcus, Cleaning Up Your Corporate Structure, CORP. CONTROL ALERT, July 2003,
at 20 ("The current thinking on minority buyouts, many lawyers say, boils down to two
words: tender offer."); see also In re Pure Res., Inc. S'holders Litig., 8o8 A.2d 421, 443 (Del.
Ch. 2002) ("The absence of convincing reasons for this disparity in treatment inspires the
plaintiffs to urge me to apply the entire fairness standard of review to Unocal's offer.
Otherwise, they say, the important protections set forth in the Lynch line of cases will be
rendered useless, as all controlling stockholders will simply choose to proceed to make
subsidiary acquisitions by way of a tender offer and later short-form merger." (emphasis
added)).
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themselves.' 2' If this assumption were correct, then the ex ante price
adjustment would be an estimate of the lower price that minority shareholders
would expect to receive in a tender offer freezeout relative to a merger
freezeout, discounted for time value and likelihood of freezeout. In reality,
however, the fact that two-thirds of freezeouts are still executed through the
merger route" introduces another probability that must be factored into the
analysis, namely, the likelihood that the controlling shareholder will proceed
via tender offer rather than merger. This probability may be particularly
difficult to estimate if it is a moving target -for example, due to gradual shifts
in legal guidance on transactional forms.
But the argument that an ex ante pricing adjustment is complicated does
not refute Pritchard's basic claim that it is possible. As long as there is no
reason to believe that the marketplace will misestimate any of the relevant
pieces of the calculation in a systematically biased way, the pricing mechanism
should, on average, compensate minority shareholders fairly, which is all that
is needed to address equity concerns and preserve allocational efficiency in the
marketplace. Moreover, the increased risk that arises from the controller's
choice of transactional form (or, more precisely, the increased volatility of
returns for minority shareholders due to the possibility of a merger freezeout)
should not depress the value of a minority stake because this is a firm-specific
(unsystematic) risk that does not get priced in the capital-asset pricing
model.123
A different, but also potentially problematic assumption inherent in
Pritchard's ex ante pricing story is that Siliconix constitutes "public"
information that will be reflected in market pricing under the semi-strong
121. See Marcus, supra note 120, at 20 (quoting Victor Lewkow, Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen
& Hamilton, stating that "I am not sure I can think of a going-private deal since Pure
Resources [in August 2002] that has been done the old-fashioned way of negotiating a one-
step merger agreement with a special committee of the target"); Telephone Interview with
Charles Nathan, supra note 52 ("All things being equal, which they never are, I would go the
Siliconix route nine times out of ten. And I think that's where most of the sophisticated
M&A guys I talk to are.").
12. See Subramanian, supra note 18, at 44 fig.i.
123. Addressing the related question of minority discounts, John Coates argues that "rules of
corporate law should at least be consistent" and that "a consistent, reliable discount rule
would permit better corporate and investment planning." Coates, supra note 18, at 1295.
This point is correct with respect to the issue of minority discounts, which creates
uncertainty from the controller's perspective as to whether the court will apply a discount in
valuing the minority shares. In contrast, Siliconix/Glassman only creates uncertainty from
the perspective of the minority shareholders, because the controller has complete control
over which transactional form it uses. If these minority investors hold a diversified portfolio,
the risk created by Siliconix/Glassman is fully diversifiable and, therefore, should not
influence their investment decision.
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version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH). Although this
assumption is usually uninteresting for most applications of the ECMH, the
translation of legal doctrine to investment implications may be nontrivial in
some situations.1 4 In fact, the available evidence suggests that Siliconix may
not constitute publicly available information. For example, the finding that
two-thirds of transactions still proceed through the traditional merger route is
consistent with the view that even corporate law practitioners (who stand to
benefit far more than potential investors from understanding Siliconix) are not
fully aware of the benefits of the Siliconix mechanism and its implications for
the price that the controller will pay. Recent corporate law textbooks do not
include references to Siliconix, much less its implications for the choice of
transactional form. 25 Taken together, this evidence suggests that minority
shareholders may not be aware of Siliconix or its implications for price, which
is an obvious prerequisite for the claim that minority investors will adjust price
to account for the new tender-offer-freezeout mechanism.
But this argument, too, does not refute Pritchard's basic contention,
because the mispricing (if any) is based solely on a learning effect rather than a
potentially more robust behavioral phenomenon. To the extent that Siliconix
should influence the pricing of a minority stake, potential minority
shareholders who fail to incorporate this information into their investment
decisions will systematically underperform compared to those who do. Over
time, Siliconix will be fully priced as investors either learn or are driven from
the marketplace.
Thus Pritchard's provocative question remains: Why should we worry
about Siliconix? Certain shareholders experienced a one-time negative wealth
effect from a shift in legal rules, but this happens all the time in corporate
law. 6 Ex ante pricing of a minority stake will adjust, either immediately or
124. See Coates, supra note 18, at 1307 ("What is not so clear .. is whether the case law [on
minority discounts] or the analysis itself should be viewed as 'public information'.....).
12S. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABrLITY COMPANIES (8th ed. 2003)
(not referencing Siliconix or Pure Resources); WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS (5th
ed. 2003) (same); CHARLs R-T. O'KELLY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2003) (same); cf D.
GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
CASE STUDIES 642 (2004) (not referencing Siliconix but excerpting Pure Resources). But see
ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 29, at 483 (noting implications of Siliconix for transactional
form and excerpting Pure Resources).
126. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns v. QVC Network 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (holding that sale
of control triggers Revlon duties, which in this case forced Viacom to pay $107 per
Paramount share, rather than the original $70, thereby transferring wealth from Viacom
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over time, thereby resolving equity concerns for prospective minority
shareholders and preserving efficiency in the marketplace.
Within the terms of the current debate, Pritchard's response to proponents
of doctrinal convergence hits home. In Part II, however, I identify an efficiency
loss inherent in existing doctrine that provides an answer to Pritchard's
important question.
3. Proposing Doctrinal Convergence Through Hybrid Approaches
Two sets of commentators have taken middle-ground approaches. Ronald
Gilson and Jeff Gordon proposed business judgment review if the controller
has complied with the procedural protections identified in Pure Resources and
the SC has veto power over the transaction (i.e., a reconsideration of Lynch),
but would impose entire fairness review if the controller goes directly to
shareholders through a tender offer without gaining SC approval (i.e., a
reconsideration of Siliconix).127 Prominent Delaware practitioner Frank Balotti,
with two colleagues, also proposed a hybrid approach, urging a "limited
fairness hearing" for freezeout tender offers, or an amendment to the Delaware
appraisal statute requiring the controller to pay all minority shareholders the
appraised valued of their shares.12s
These approaches are well considered in that they seek to balance the
competing concerns of protecting minority shareholders and facilitating value-
creating transactions. As I describe in Part III, my own proposal for reform
comes closest to these middle-ground approaches, but for different reasons.
However, these proposals do not explain why the effects of Siliconix and
Glassman will not simply be priced ex ante. As described in the previous
Subsection, defenders of the status quo point out that there are no apparent
barriers to a private solution in the freezeout arena. Specifically, potential
investors will simply pay less, going forward, for a minority position in a
controlled company, on the expectation that they will receive less if they are
forced to exit.'29 Without addressing this basic point, proponents of doctrinal
shareholders, notably controlling shareholder Sumner Redstone, to Paramount
shareholders).
127. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 81, at 838-40.
128. See Aronstam et al., supra note 77, at 552-57; Bradley R. Aronstam et al., Revisiting Delaware's
Going-Private Dilemma Post-Pure Resources, 59 Bus. LAw. 1459 (2004).
129. For a general description of this point, see, for example, FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DAnEL
R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUctURE OF CORPORATE LAw 146 (1991), which notes that
"the majority, not the minority, bears the cost ex ante of the potential exploitation of the
minority ex post."
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reform cannot motivate the case for change. In the next Part, I attempt to
do so.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH EXISTING DOCTRINE
In Part I, I reviewed the divergent doctrinal strands on freezeouts and
summarized the already substantial body of literature that has developed in
response. I concluded that while the doctrinal differences are indeed dramatic,
and have had an impact on deal outcomes, the case for change has remained
unclear. In this Part, I identify the real problem with existing doctrine. Tender-
offer-freezeout doctrine facilitates some inefficient (value-destroying)
transactions by allowing the controller to exploit asymmetric information
against the minority. Merger-freezeout doctrine makes the opposite mistake-
deterring some efficient (value-creating) transactions -because the SC has
excessive power to block the deal. Taken together, this analysis identifies an
efficiency loss that motivates my proposal for reform, which I describe in Part
III.
A. Opportunistic Behavior in Tender Offer Freezeouts
1. The Determination of Price in Tender Offer Freezeouts
In a merger freezeout, the SC bargaining process and the prospect or
actuality of entire fairness review determine the price paid to the minority
shareholders. The determination of price in a tender offer freezeout differs in
two important respects. First, the SC does not have meaningful bargaining
power in freezeout negotiations: It cannot veto the transaction, and its only
formal authority is to issue a 14D- 9 recommendation within ten days of the
offer. This absence of bargaining power manifests itself in deal outcomes:
Controllers pay less in tender offers than in mergers.'
A second difference is that minority shareholders' exclusive remedy in a
tender offer freezeout is appraisal, not an entire fairness proceeding, which is
less potent for two reasons. First, unlike plaintiff shareholders in a class action
claim for entire fairness, plaintiffs in an appraisal proceeding must bear their
own costs, including legal fees and the costs of expert witnesses.131 Second,
unlike plaintiffs in an entire fairness action, minority shareholders in appraisal
13o. See Subramanian, supra note 18, at 49 tbl-3.
131. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 301 (Del. 1996); Andra v. Blount, 772
A.2d 183, 184 (Del. Ch. 2ooo).
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proceedings must choose between accepting the consideration offered and
demanding a judicially determined appraisal of their shares.132 Because of these
factors it is well accepted among academic commentators and practitioners that
appraisal is a weak remedy compared to entire fairness review.1
3
Without a meaningful SC bargaining process or the background threat of
entire fairness review, the sole remaining constraint on the price that the
controller pays in a tender offer freezeout is the prevailing market price.
Practitioner interviews and anecdotal evidence confirm this conclusion. For
example, according to Charles Nathan of Latham & Watkins: "What you're
doing in Siliconix is negotiating with the market, you're not negotiating with
the special committee, in the sense that as long as your price will clear enough
of the market to get to ninety percent, you win. " " In fact, in Siliconix itself, the
chancery court found that the controlling shareholder had determined its offer
price simply "by applying a io% premium to the then market price of Siliconix
stock."3'
2. Categories of Opportunistic Behavior
The ability to freeze out the minority at some increment over the market
price in a tender offer freezeout, as opposed to "fair value" in a merger
freezeout, introduces the possibility of opportunistic behavior by the controller.
I now describe the two basic ways in which opportunistic behavior can
manifest itself.
132. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 262(h) (2O01).
133. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 118, § 12.2, at 5o8 ("[A]ppraisal is often a cumbersome
remedy."); John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware
Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Ineflicient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 359,
412 (1996) ("Standing alone, the appraisal remedy cannot begin to assure the receipt of
proportionate value."); Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's
Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEo. L.J. 1, 48-49 (1995); see also Aronstam et al., supra note 77, at
556 (proposing statutory amendments that would shore up the appraisal remedy).
134. See Telephone Interview with Charles Nathan, supra note 52; see also Morphy, supra note 117
("In a tender offer the controlling stockholder, in effect, says to the other stockholders,
'Here is my offer: the stock was trading at $6.25, I'm willing to pay you $8.oo. That's your
choice-you can have $8.00 or you can have $6.25.'").
135. In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *2 (Del. Ch. June
19, 2001).
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a. Freezeout Timing
First, the controller determines the timing of a freezeout. This means that a
controller can freeze out the minority when it perceives that the market price of
the target stock is lower than its intrinsic value.3 6 Although insider trading
restrictions prevent the most egregious forms of this kind of opportunism, the
controller may be able to take advantage of smaller pieces of nonpublic
information, which individually do not meet the test for materiality, but
collectively give the controller greater insight than the public minority
shareholders about the intrinsic value of the company.'37
This kind of opportunism is not possible in a merger freezeout because the
court will engage in, and the SC will bargain in the shadow of, a de novo
examination of fair value. This background legal entitlement works to detach
the offer price from the market price, because in entire fairness proceedings
courts give little evidentiary weight to prevailing market prices.' Because the
controller will have little or no informational advantage over the SC, it is
unable to exploit differences between market price and intrinsic value in
merger-freezeout negotiations.
b. Influencing the Target's Value
A second way in which a controller might engage in an opportunistic
tender offer freezeout is by influencing the value of the target, thereby altering
the target's market price and, in turn, the baseline for the tender-offer-
freezeout price.'39 John Coates summarizes the three categories of this kind of
136. See CLARK, supra note 118, §12.2, at 507 ("[A]t what time is (the controller] likely to stage a
freezeout? The answer is dear: when he knows that the company is really worth more than
its current market price.").
137. See id. at 507-08.
138. See, e.g., In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL
1305745 (Del. Ch. June 4, 2004) (involving a $7.00 pre-deal market price, a $10.25 deal price,
and a $38.05 judicially assessed fair value); Harris v. Rapid-Am. Corp., Civ. A. No. 6462,
1992 WL 69614 (Del. Ch. Apr. 6, 1992) (involving a $21.88 pre-deal market price, a $28
merger price, and a $73.29 judicially assessed fair value); In re Shell Oil Co., Civ. A. No.
8o8o, 199o WL 201390 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 199o), affd, 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992) (involving a
$44 market price and a $71.20 judicially assessed fair value). See generally Daniel R. Fischel,
Market Evidence in Corporate Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 941, 941 (2002) ("Market prices are
frequently given little or no weight in resolving valuation disputes in corporate law.").
139. It might be possible to influence the market price without influencing the value of the
underlying assets through selective disclosure. See Victor Brudney, Efficient Markets and Fair
Values in Parent Subsidiary Mergers, 4 J. CORP. L. 63, 71 (1978) (noting the controller's
potential for expropriation that arises from "systematic impediments to the flow of
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behavior: underinvestment in positive net present value (NPV) projects;
investment in negative NPV projects; and shirking managerial
responsibilities. 40 Each of these three categories can be further divided into
reversible value reductions and nonreversible value reductions.
Value reductions that are fully reversible are difficult to come by in the real
world, but are theoretically possible. Consider the case of a one-time positive
NPV project, for which the only question is whether to implement the project
before or after the freezeout. If the project is not completely transparent to the
marketplace, a controller might rationally delay this investment until after the
freezeout, in order to reap the full benefit rather than sharing the benefit with
the minority. This value diversion would be difficult to detect, and, even if
detected, would likely be protected by the business judgment rule, particularly
if there were some plausible basis for the delay (e.g., reduced risk due to the
delay).
As demonstrated by the example in the previous Subsection,'41 this
opportunistic behavior would not be possible in a merger freezeout because the
opportunity presented by the positive NPV project would likely be known to
the SC and to the court. It is the information asymmetry between the controller
and the minority shareholders, as compared to the relative symmetry between
the controller and the SC, that facilitates the controller's opportunistic behavior
in a tender offer freezeout.
In contrast to the one-time positive NPV project, most value reductions are
at least partially nonreversible. Take the example of managerial shirking, which
reduces firm value in ways that cannot be fully recovered after the freezeout if
certain corporate opportunities are time-limited. When the value reduction
cannot be reversed fully, the controller's incentives are less clear, because the
reduction will hurt the controller in proportion to its pre-deal stake in the
target. But even with respect to these types of value reductions, it is easy to
identify situations in which it is still in the controller's interest to deliberately
reduce firm value pre-freezeout, provided the value reduction is at least
information to the market"). To take the simplest example, the controller might cause the
target to deliberately delay the release of positive information about the company in order to
buy the minority shares at an artificially depressed price in a tender offer freezeout. Outside
of quarterly disclosures mandated by SEC rules and a duty to correct statements previously
made, there is generally no affirmative duty to disclose even material developments to the
marketplace. See THOMAS J. DOUGHERTY, THE DREcroRs' HANDBOOK 28 (2004). However,
the ability to buy minority shares without disclosing material facts about the target company
is severely limited by insider trading restrictions, the controller's general fiduciary duty to
the target corporation, and the controller's "duty of candor" that arises from membership on
the target board.
140. See Coates, supra note 18, at 1316.
141. See supra Subsection II.A.2.a.
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partially reversible after the freezeout. 142 In any particular case the controller
would compare its share of the nonreversible value reduction (which is
proportional to the controller's pre-freezeout stake) against the benefit that
arises from a lower tender offer price.
3. Efficiency Implications
Following the ex ante pricing argument described in Part I,"4 one could
argue that the controller's opportunistic behavior will also be priced in the
minority's initial stake. That is, minority investors will understand not only the
lower price that they will receive in a freezeout under the tender offer
mechanism, but also the controller's enhanced ability to exploit asymmetric
information to its benefit. Over time, both of these effects will be fully priced
ex ante, eliminating any unfairness to the minority and maintaining
allocational efficiency.
Despite the superficial appeal of this argument, the possibility for
opportunistic behavior does, in fact, yield three types of efficiency losses:
through nonreversible value reductions, the facilitation of some value-reducing
freezeouts, and reduced access to minority capital. I now discuss each of these
effects in turn.
a. Nonreversible Value Reductions
The first, most obvious, social welfare loss arises from nonreversible value
reductions. As described above, the controller may have incentives to engage in
nonreversible value reductions in order to pay a lower price in the tender offer
freezeout, because the loss from the nonreversible value reduction may be
offset by the gain to the controller in the form of a lower tender offer price.
These nonreversible value reductions, by definition, constitute an efficiency
loss because they reduce the intrinsic value of the target company.
142. For example, consider a 5o% controller contemplating a $io value-reducing maneuver, of
which $8 can be regained after the freezeout. The controller would bear $5 out of the $io in
value reduction but then would gain $8 back after the freezeout, for a net gain of $3. See also
Coates, supra note 18, at 1316 n.2o8 (providing a similar quantitative example). To
generalize, the controller will engage in value-reducing behavior whenever the fraction of
value regained after the freezeout is greater than the controller's pre-deal stake in the
company.
143. See supra Subsection I.D.2.
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b. Facilitating Some Inefficient Freezeouts
A second social welfare loss arises from the possibility of buying the
minority shares at less than their intrinsic value. In many cases, the gap
between intrinsic value and market value might be bridged by the premium
over market that the controller must pay in order to succeed in a tender offer
freezeout. The empirical evidence in my companion paper indicates that, on
average, premiums in post-Siliconix tender offer freezeouts are approximately
25% higher than the preannouncement market price of the target stock.'"
While this kind of gap between intrinsic value and market value would be rare
(though not implausible) in well-functioning capital markets, the controller's
ability to influence the market price makes a gap of this magnitude more likely
in the controlled company context.
To the extent the controller is able to buy the minority shares for less than
their intrinsic value, the controller would be able to make a profit on a value-
destroying (negative synergy) freezeout. To see this point, consider a company
that has a higher intrinsic value as a public company than as a private
company-for example, from the ability to attract managers with publicly
traded stock options, the benefit of having an acquisition currency, or the
advantage of analyst coverage. The controller might nevertheless decide to take
the company private through a tender offer freezeout if it has the opportunity
to buy the minority shares for less than their intrinsic value. The gains from
the tender offer would subsidize the negative consequences of going private,
even though overall social welfare is higher if the company remains publicly
traded. In these cases the tender-offer-freezeout mechanism might facilitate
some value-destroying (inefficient) transactions.
c. Reduced Access to Minority Capital
The third, more subtle, social welfare loss that arises from tender offer
freezeouts arises from the "lemons effect" in corporate freezeouts, first
identified and described in detail by Lucian Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan. 4' If,
as described above, the controller will freeze out the minority when the market
price is lower than the intrinsic value, then minority shareholders should
(rationally) receive an important signal when the controller does not freeze
them out- namely, that the market price fully values or perhaps overvalues the
144. See Subramanian, supra note 18, at 46 tbl.2A.
145. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in
Corporate Freezeouts, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 247 (Randall K. Morck ed.,
2000).
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company. Through backward induction, the minority shareholders should
rationally bid down the value of the stock. In the extreme form of the Bebchuk
and Kahan model, the market price of the minority shares is bid down to zero
because of the negative signal that the lack of a freezeout conveys.146
Zohar Goshen and Zvi Wiener develop a more general model of the
Bebchuk and Kahan lemons effect to demonstrate that the greater the influence
of market prices in determining the freezeout price, the more depressed the
market price of the minority stock will be.' 47 At one extreme, if market prices
have no influence in the determination of the freezeout price, the minority
stock is only slightly discounted relative to a pro rata share of going concern
value. At the other extreme, and consistent with the Bebchuk and Kahan
model, if market prices are the only determinant of the freezeout price, the
minority shares will be worthless. Goshen and Wiener conclude that
"ironically, the less reliance courts put on market prices, the more accurate are
market prices as a reflection of fair value."
4
1
These theoretical models have important implications for the current
doctrinal regime. Because the merger-freezeout process detaches the freezeout
price from the market price, through the combination of the SC bargaining
process and the shadow of entire fairness review, merger freezeouts do not
trigger the lemons effect. But because prevailing market prices are the primary
determinant of price in a tender offer freezeout, the lemons effect will work to
depress the value of the minority shares to the extent that the tender offer
mechanism is used.
Of course, several real-world factors might limit the manifestation of the
lemons problem. For example, while the theoretical models assume that the
controlling shareholder can unilaterally freeze out the minority, in the real
world minority shareholders may say no through their tender decision. If a
sufficient percentage of minority shareholders refuse to tender, the controller
will be unable to get to the 90% threshold that allows a short-form merger.
Minority shareholders might refuse to tender even if the offer is at a substantial
premium if they infer good news from the controller's tender offer itself.
Similarly, if the controller only makes a tender offer when the inherent value of
the firm is higher than the market value, then minority shareholders, knowing
146. Paul G. Mahoney, Comment, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, supra note 145, at
259, 26o (discussing Bebchuk and Kahan's chapter in the same volume).
147. See Zohar Goshen & Zvi Wiener, The Value of the Freezeout Option (Sept. 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
148. Id. at 8.
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this fact ex ante, should refuse to tender in order to share in the upside that the
controller signals by making a tender offer.
1 49
Other constraints are also possible. A controlling shareholder might not
freeze out the minority even if the inherent value is greater than the market
value if the controller has capital constraints. (Indeed, capital constraints may
have caused the controller to issue the minority stake in the first place.) The
absence of a freezeout by a capital-constrained controller should convey no
signal to the minority, thereby preventing the adverse inference which would
trigger the lemons effect. Another possibility is that lawyers will not
recommend tender offer freezeouts to their clients, either due to doctrinal
uncertainty' ° or unfamiliarity with the benefits of the tender-offer-freezeout
mechanism.'
149. One term for this effect might be "reactive revaluation," as it is the converse of the well-
known phenomenon of "reactive devaluation." Cf John C. Coates IV & Guhan
Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307,
357 (2000) (identifying the possibility of "reactive revaluation" in a bidding contest between
competing bidders). While rational revaluation is theoretically plausible, the theory's
prediction-that minority shareholders should never tender-does not square with
empirical reality. In my database of all post-Siliconix freezeouts, I find that thirty out of
thirty-six freezeout tender offers (83%) were successful. Subramanian, supra note 18, at 44
fig.i. One possible explanation for this finding is behavioral: Minority shareholders might
not "look forward and reason back" in a sufficiently sophisticated way to rationally revalue
in response to a freezeout tender offer. See MAx H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE,
NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 109-13 (1992). This explanation, if correct, would be consistent
with a large and growing literature from behavioral economics indicating that even
sophisticated investors do not always follow the predictions of the rational actor model. See
generally Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. Rsv. 135 (2002). There is a potential rational
explanation as well. If the gains from the freezeout are contingent upon the success of the
freezeout, then minority shareholders should not rationally revalue their shares in response
to the freezeout tender offer. The most obvious example would be Sarbanes-Oxley
compliance costs, which many controlling shareholders cite as an important motivation for
their freezeouts. See supra note 16. Clearly, these savings would not be realized if the
freezeout were not successful; therefore minority shareholders should not rationally revalue
in response to the freezeout offer. The controller can also construct a contingent gain of this
kind, as a way of inducing minority shareholders to tender, by threatening to not implement
the value-increasing initiative unless the freezeout is successful. While this kind of threat
would no doubt be implicit, and the credibility of the threat may be lacking given the
controller's already-large stake in the company, the threat is at least plausible because the
controller has the ability to make investment and operational decisions for the target.
iso. See David Marcus, An End Run in Delaware, CORP. CONTROL ALERT, Dec. 2001, at 8, 9
(quoting Charles Nathan, Partner, Latham & Watkins, stating that "[tlhe risk is being the
poster child for the reversal of Siliconix").
1s. See Telephone Interview with Richard Hall, Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore (Mar. 4,
2004) ("In the current environment, I would say to a controlling stockholder, 'it is very hard
to see any reason to go the special committee route rather than the Pure Resources [tender
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These checks are likely to prevent the extreme manifestation of the lemons
effect, in which minority shares are worthless. But to the extent that the
lemons effect depresses the price of minority shares, pre-IPO owners would
have to sell a greater fraction of the company in order to raise the same dollar
value of public capital. The increase in dilution may deter some entrepreneurs
from selling a public stake, even when it would be socially desirable for the
entrepreneur to do so.' The clearest example would be a situation in which,
absent a lemons effect, the controller would only have to sell a minority stake,
and therefore would retain control; but with a lemons effect the controller
would have to sell more than 50% to the public in order to raise the same
amount of capital. In this scenario the entrepreneur might be deterred from
going to the public capital markets at all and instead might prefer a strategy
that could be financed through internally generated capital.
One could argue that the entrepreneur in this situation has another
alternative-a dual-class IPO-which would allow the pre-IPO owners to
retain control while raising public capital. However, dual-class structures
generate considerable skepticism in the marketplace," 3 which in itself depresses
the trading price for the nonvoting or low-voting class of stock.'54 In order to
avoid this treatment, pre-IPO owners may wish to maintain the connection
between cash-flow ownership and voting rights through a single class of stock.
But the possibility of a tender offer freezeout will depress the price that they
will receive in this offering. The result will be a distortion, at the margin, of the
entrepreneur's decision on whether to sell a public stake.
offer] route.' But I believe there may be lawyers who, when they observe some reluctance on
the part of their controlling stockholder clients in acting unilaterally [through a tender
offer], do not firmly enough impress upon them the benefits of the Pure Resources structure
over the special committee structure."); Interview with Charles Nathan, supra note 52
("[Tlhere may be lack of awareness on the part of many lawyers of the availability and value
of the Siliconix structure.").
152. This point differs only in magnitude from a potential efficiency loss that arises from ex ante
pricing of Siliconix itself. Unlike minority shareholders in some developing countries, who
have very few protections against self-dealing by the controller, U.S. minority shareholders
have certain baseline protections (e.g., appraisal) that make it unlikely that Siliconix will
have a significant direct effect on the controllers' ability to raise capital. The argument here
is that an indirect lemons effect, rather than a direct pricing effect, is more likely to affect the
controller's ability to raise minority capital.
153. See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins Jr., GoogleBaloney, WAU ST. J., May 5, 2004, at A15.
154. See Paul A. Gompers et al., Incentives vs. Control: An Analysis of U.S. Dual Class
Companies (Dec. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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B. Deterring Efficient Freezeouts Through the Merger Mechanism
In the previous Section, I demonstrated how existing doctrine encourages
some inefficient tender offer freezeouts. I now discuss ways in which existing
doctrine also discourages some efficient merger freezeouts. Specifically, I
demonstrate that the procedural protections for minority shareholders
identified in Part I- the negotiation between the controlling shareholder and
the SC and the possibility (or actuality) of entire fairness review -can deter
some value-increasing merger-freezeout transactions.
1. The Problem of Special Committee Resistance
a. With Special Committee Veto Power
As described in Part I, the post-Lynch world of freezeout merger
negotiations seems to require SC veto power over the transaction.' To the
extent that there is ambiguity about this point (discussed in the next
SubsectionlS6), many controllers explicitly bestow veto power on the SC in a
merger freezeout.' s7 My empirical evidence indicates that SCs have made
frequent use of this veto power. In my database of all post-Siliconix freezeouts,
I find that the controller withdrew in eighteen out of the eighty freezeout
merger negotiations with an SC that were announced between June 2001 and
April 2005, a 23% failure rate, even though the controller's first offer invariably
represented a premium over the prevailing market price. '
An obvious concern in this area is that SCs might reject some freezeout
offers out of self-interest rather than the interest of minority shareholders. The
155. See In re First Boston, Inc. S'holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10338, 1990 WL 78836, at *7 (Del.
Ch. June 7, 1990) (noting the importance of an SC retaining "the critical power: the power
to say no"); Coffee, supra note 133, at 389 ("[Lynch] creates an apparent standoff: the
monopolistic buyer confronts the monopsonistic seller, and the outcome of these
negotiations becomes uncertain even in theory."); see also In re W. Nat. Corp. S'holders
Litig., No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192, at *24 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2000) ("The Special
Committee indicated that it would not recommend a deal at $29.00 per share and counter-
offered $31.00 per share. Devlin [the controller] rejected $31.00 per share and walked
away.").
1s6. See infra Subsection II.B.i.b.
157. See, e.g., Press Release, Cox Commc'ns, Response from Cox Communications, Inc.,
Regarding Cox Enterprises, Inc.'s Proposal to Acquire Public Minority Shares (Aug. 2,
2004), reprinted in Cox Commc'ns, Current Report (Form 8-K), at Exhibit 99.1 (Aug. 2,
2004) (noting the appointment of an SC to review the proposal).
i5S. See Subramanian, supra note 18, at 44 figa.
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independent directors who are appointed to the SC typically leave the target
board when the target becomes a wholly owned subsidiary of the controlling
shareholder. Therefore, precisely the same agency issues that have pervaded
the debate about target-board resistance in hostile takeovers apply to SC
resistance against a controlling shareholder. Yet the Delaware courts have
approached these two questions in dramatically different ways. In the hostile
takeover context, defensive tactics taken by target boards are subject to
enhanced intermediate scrutiny as articulated in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum, s9 because of the "omnipresent specter" that directors are acting in
their self-interest rather than in the interest of the corporation.i6o But in the
merger-freezeout context, the Delaware courts have not only permitted
unfettered SC veto power, they seem to have required it. This dramatically
different approach in the merger-freezeout arena may deter some efficient
freezeouts.
Agency problems may play out in a more subtle way as well, due to the
litigious nature of the merger-freezeout process. According to a senior
corporate lawyer with significant experience advising SCs in freezeouts:
Imagine yourself in that role [of an SC member]. You are, to be sure,
paid a special fee for this combat duty-but peanuts in the greater
scheme of things ... say $5oK. You receive that fee irrespective of
whether you do or don't endorse the controller's proposal. There's a
near certainty that you'll be sued if you endorse that proposal. And,
your asserted independence notwithstanding, some subset of the world
suspects, or at least the plaintiffs' bar will assert, that the game is
rigged. The easiest and safest course is plainly to duck or run. No
wonder you insist on the controller's offering $X more per share before
you present your chin in the middle of the ring. 6 '
As suggested by this anecdotal evidence, unchecked veto power, combined
with potentially misaligned incentives between the SC members and the
minority shareholders, creates at least the potential for some efficient
freezeouts to be blocked. 62
159. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
16o. Id. at 954.
161. See Confidential E-mail from Senior Corporate Lawyer to Guhan Subramanian (June 30,
2004, 09:28:07 EST) (on file with author).
162. One way of empirically testing this possibility would be to examine the aftermath of failed
freezeout negotiations. If final offers in failed freezeouts are unduly low, then targets that
are able to successfully resist (through a loyal SC) should experience positive abnormal
returns. If, instead, final offers in failed freezeouts are fully priced, then targets that
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b. Without Special Committee Veto Power
As practitioners become more comfortable with the tender-offer-freezeout
mechanism, merger freezeouts may increasingly be negotiated in the shadow of
a tender-offer-freezeout threat. In a curious twist of Delaware corporate law,
the controller would be subject to entire fairness review, with no burden shift,
if the controller threatens a tender offer, and the SC agrees to a merger deal on
the basis of the threat. 6 ' But if the controller simply breaks off negotiations, a
subsequent (even immediate) tender offer to the minority would seem to avoid
entire fairness review.'6 4 In view of these twists, a well-advised controller will
engage in a kabuki dance of making a final offer, and perhaps hinting at its
walk-away alternative, but not threatening the SC in a manner that would
eliminate the SC's ability to say no under Lynch.
Interestingly, no freezeout of a Delaware target since Siliconix has exhibited
the pattern of merger freezeout negotiations, impasse, and a tender offer to the
minority, possibly due to a broad reading of Lynch that requires SC veto power.
But a recent freezeout involving a Minnesota target, where Lynch is not binding
authority, illustrates how this shadow might play out going forward. In
December 2003, Kontron AG (Kontron) offered to buy the remaining 35% of
Kontron Mobile (Mobile) that it did not already own for $0.45 cash per
share. 6 ' Kontron proposed to structure the deal as a two-step tender offer,
subject to approval by an SC of independent directors and a MOM
condition. 66 The Mobile SC hired legal and financial advisors and began
negotiating with Kontron.
successfully resist should experience zero or negative abnormal returns. Unfortunately, the
empirical evidence does not resolve this issue: examining all sixteen failed merger freezeouts
that were announced between July 2001 and April 2004, I find an even split between deals in
which the minority shareholders did better and deals in which minority shareholders did
worse over the subsequent twelve months, relative to the controller's final offer. See
Subramanian, supra note 17.
163. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., 638 A.2d 111o, iii8 (Del. 1994).
164. See In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 187oo, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June
19, 2001).
165. See Kontron Mobile Computing, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at i (Dec. 3, 2003).
166. See Kontron Mobile Computing Inc., Tender Offer Statement (Schedule TO), at 14 (June 15,
2004). Because the deal was conditioned on SC approval, it required board action that
would have triggered entire fairness review. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 5-7,
Hartley v. Peapod, Inc., No. Civ. A. 19025-NC, 2002 WL 31957458 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2002)
(Lamb, V.C.) (stating that a two-step tender offer pursuant to a merger agreement is
"completely different than Siliconix" and "is definitely an entire fairness case under settled
[Delaware] Supreme Court law.").
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In March 2004, Kontron expressed "disappointment" about the lack of
progress in these negotiations, and, in an effort to push things forward, took
the unusual step of offering to either match or sell to any bona fide third-party
bidder that the Mobile SC might come up with.167 The SC responded that it
would take "a significant amount of time" to undertake the market check that
Kontron had suggested. 68 Kontron responded that it would make a tender
offer directly to the minority shareholders at $0.55 per share, with a 90%
closing condition.169 The Mobile SC issued a 14 D-9 , remaining neutral on the
offer.17° Kontron successfully acquired 91% of the voting shares in its tender
offer, thereby satisfying the 90% condition, 17' and completed its short-form
back-end merger in August 2004.172
As the Kontron fact pattern begins to appear more often, the efficiency loss
that arises from tender-offer-freezeout doctrine will spill over into the merger-
freezeout arena. The reason is that the controller's walk-away alternative is no
longer to do nothing, but rather, if carefully orchestrated, to make a tender
offer to the minority. The SC may therefore agree to a price, even if it does not
believe that this price represents fair value (perhaps due to nonpublic
information), if it believes that the controller would be successful in a tender
offer to the minority at that price.
In a regime in which the tender offer option is well understood, therefore,
prices in merger freezeouts will be driven down to the predicted prices in
tender offer freezeouts 73 Plaintiffs' counsel will be even less effective than the
SC in extracting more than the tender offer price because the tender offer
alternative avoids entire fairness review entirely. Therefore, there is no
settlement value that translates into a higher price in the merger-freezeout
negotiations. This conclusion introduces the efficiency loss that is inherent in
tender offer doctrine, including the controller's incentive to engage in
opportunistic behavior against the minority.
167. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, supra note 166, at 5-7.
168. See id.
169. See Kontron Mobile Computing Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement (Schedule
14D-9), at i (July 21, 2004).
170. See id.
17. See Kontron Mobile Computing Inc., Tender Offer Statement (Schedule TO), at 3 (Aug. 9,
2004).
172. See Kontron Mobile Computing Inc., Certification and Notice of Termination of
Registration (Form 15) (Aug. 23, 2004).
173. The empirical evidence available to date neither supports nor rejects this theoretical
prediction. See Subramanian, supra note 18, at 29.
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2. The Problem of Deterred Deals
While the problem of blocked deals involves efficient freezeouts that are
initiated by the controller but are not consummated, the problem of deterred
deals involves efficient freezeouts that are never initiated. I discuss two
deterrent effects: the fact that SCs in the current regime are likely to extract
some part of the synergies in freezeout mergers that occur; and the possibility
that entire fairness litigation acts as a "tax" on the controller's freezeout
decision.
a. Through Allocation of Deal Synergies
I begin with the assumption that the likelihood that a controller will initiate
a freezeout increases monotonically with the controller's expected profits from
the deal. 74 It follows that the controller should receive the full value of the
synergies from the deal, in order to maximize the likelihood that controllers
will initiate value-creating freezeouts.'Us The question then becomes whether
and to what extent the merger-freezeout process provides the controller with
the full value of the synergies from the deal.
The overall picture on this question is that courts have been notoriously
unpredictable in their approach to synergy value in entire fairness proceedings.
As a starting point, courts in entire fairness proceedings generally look to the
appraisal remedy, and here section 262(h) of the Delaware corporate code
mandates that "fair value" in appraisal shall be determined "exclusive of any
174. I thank Victor Goldberg for helpful conversations in developing this assumption. In
contrast, Gilson and Gordon assume that the controller will initiate a freezeout as long as its
profits from the deal are positive. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 81, at 804 n.73.
175. Easterbrook and Fischel, and Hermalin and Schwartz, reach the same conclusion, but for
reasons that are problematic in a similar way. Easterbrook and Fischel examine corporate
control transactions generally and conclude that "all shareholders can benefit from rules that
allow the party responsible for a gain to allocate to himself as much as he can." Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 700
(1982). This is only true if the controller needs to expend effort in order to identify and
realize the gain, as is the case, for example, with corporate opportunities. In freezeouts,
however, the gains often arise with no effort required from the controller- elimination of
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs is a paradigmatic example of the kind of benefit that, in
fact, requires "negative effort" from the controller in order to be realized. Similarly,
Hermalin and Schwartz develop a theoretical model demonstrating that the controller will
expend suboptimal effort to generate gains unless the controller does not have to share these
gains with the minority. See Benjamin Hermalin & Alan Schwartz, Buyouts in Large
Companies, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 358 (1996). Again, this model assumes that effort is
required in order to achieve the benefits from the deal, a plausible assumption in general,
but often not valid in the context of freezeouts.
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element of value arising from the accomplishment . . . of the merger." 176
Although this language on its face would seem to exclude synergy value,
Delaware courts have muddied the water considerably. Weinberger began the
confusion with its holding that section 262(h) only excludes "speculative
elements of value that may arise from the 'accomplishment or expectation' of
the merger."1" While subsequent chancery court opinions have read
Weinberger narrowly in order to exclude synergy value from the minority's
entitlement,171 on the one occasion that the Delaware Supreme Court revisited
Weinberger's reading of section 262(h) it confirmed its earlier holding.
179
In addition, there is a more subtle way in which courts might arrive at a
share of the synergies. In contrast to valuation in an appraisal proceeding,
courts are not bound by the statutory language of section 262(h) in an entire
fairness proceeding. In particular, a court may determine that fairness requires
rescissory damages, defined as what minority shareholders would receive if the
freezeout transaction were rescinded."'o If the synergies from the deal do not
depend on taking the company from public to private status, then a rescissory
damages approach would provide minority shareholders with a share of the
synergies from the deal.
Using either Weinberger's interpretation of section 262(h) or the flexibility
inherent in an equitable remedy, then, courts have the authority to award a
share of the synergies in an entire fairness proceeding. As a result, SCs
bargaining in the shadow of entire fairness will be able to extract a share of the
synergies as well. Reducing the controller's expected profits from the freezeout
in this way deters some value-increasing freezeouts, under the assumption that
the likelihood of freezeout increases monotonically with the controller's profits
from the deal.
176. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2001).
177. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
178. See, e.g., Union Illinois 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Group Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 343
(Del. Ch. 2004) ("The appraisal award excludes synergies in accordance with the mandate
of Delaware jurisprudence that the subject company in an appraisal proceeding be valued as
a going concern."); In re Vision Hardware Group, 669 A.2d 671, 677 (Del. Ch. 1995) ("The
objective of this appraisal proceeding is to provide the dissenting shareholders the value of
their shares at the time of the merger from which they dissented." (citing DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, S 262(h) (2OOl))).
179. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996) (reversing a chancery court
ruling that synergy value should be excluded in determining fair value in an appraisal
proceeding). I thank Jill Fisch for helpful conversations on this point.
i8o. See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 29, at 454.
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b. Through Litigation Costs
A second factor that might deter some deals is the high likelihood of
litigation costs that arises from merger-freezeout doctrine. The availability of a
class action claim for entire fairness, combined with a presumption that the
first to file should be named lead or co-lead counsel, creates a "race to the
courthouse" in which plaintiffs' counsel will typically file multiple lawsuits in
the few days (and even hours) after the freezeout merger is announced.s This
litigation activity imposes costs on the controlling shareholder because the
controller will typically agree, in effect, to pay plaintiffs' legal fees as part of its
settlement."2 These litigation costs do not create an ex post social welfare loss,
because they merely represent a wealth transfer from the controller to
plaintiffs' counsel. Rather, a social welfare loss might arise because a controller
may be deterred ex ante from initiating an efficient transaction by the expected
"tax" imposed by plaintiffs' counsel.
The empirical evidence indicates that this tax represents a trivial fraction of
the overall value of transactions: One study of shareholder class actions in
Delaware finds a fee range of 0.o05% to 1.36% of the deal value, with an
average fee of o.19%.183 By way of comparison, the tax imposed by investment
bankers, lawyers, and accountants in arms-length acquisitions is typically in
the range of i.o% to 2.0% of deal value. 8 4 Therefore, while expected litigation
costs might deter merger freezeouts in theory, the magnitude of the litigation
costs as a percentage of deal value suggests that such deterrence, if any, should
be small in practice.
In the recent and important decision In re Cox Communications, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation,'8 Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Chancery
Court reduced the fee for plaintiffs' counsel in the Cox Communications
freezeout from the requested $4.95 million (amounting to o.o6% of deal value)
to $1.275 million (o.o15% of deal value). The case involved the merger
freezeout of the Cox Communications minority shareholders described in the
181. See Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law
(Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1827-28, 1833-34, 1846 (2004).
182. See id. at 1818.
183. See id. at 1831.
184. See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 149, at 382 n.209 (reporting that "total financial
advisor fees," which include banker fees but not accountant or lawyer fees, averaged 1.4% of
deal value in 1999, but noting that data on fees is "spotty").
18S. CA. No. 613-N, 2005 WL 2001310 (Del. Ch. June 6, 2005). The reader should note that I
was retained by plaintiffs' counsel to provide empirical evidence on freezeouts generally and
to apply this evidence to the Cox freezeout.
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Introduction to this Article. While the court endorsed the empirical claim that
prices in merger freezeouts are higher than prices in tender offer freezeouts, 86
the court held that the vast majority of the difference was attributable to the
SC's bargaining power and not to the efforts of plaintiffs' counsel armed with a
litigation threat over fairness. 1s7 The court also expressed its displeasure at the
"premature, hastily-drafted, makeweight complaints attacking a fully
negotiable proposal by the Cox family.",
8 8
Of course, it is too soon to tell what the consequences of the court's
decision in Cox Communications will be. Simplistic, first-order predictions are
obvious: To the extent that other chancery court judges follow this precedent,
fee awards and fee requests will be lower, which will lead to an even smaller
deterrence effect in the merger freezeout arena than currently exists. In
addition, plaintiffs' counsel will be more likely to wait until the SC has agreed
to a price before deciding whether to bring a class action fairness claim, both to
make their contribution transparent and to avoid the accusation of "premature"
litigation.
Potential second-order effects are more troubling. If plaintiffs' counsel do
in fact hold back to let the SC "work its magic," as urged by the Cox court,
controlling shareholders will be less likely to pay full value to the SC due to the
uncertainty in its next round of negotiations with plaintiffs' counsel. The
prospect of two sequential negotiations, in which the first negotiation sets a
price floor for the second, is likely to be more onerous to the controller than a
single simultaneous negotiation with the SC and plaintiffs' counsel. The result
would be increased (not decreased) deterrence of merger freezeouts and, in the
case of undeterred deals, a greater likelihood of impasse with the SC because of
the controller's lower willingness to pay full value.
Another problematic effect arises from the fact that plaintiffs' counsel have
choices about where to bring shareholder class action complaints. If Delaware
courts are perceived as being stingy about fees in freezeout litigation, plaintiffs'
counsel will bring their claims in other states that can exercise jurisdiction over
the deal, such as the state that is home to the target's headquarters or principal
place of business19 These other states will have less well-developed judicial
approaches to freezeouts than Delaware, which would introduce further
186. Id. at *2o-22 (citing Subramanian, supra note 18).
187. Id. at *32 (holding that the increase "was almost entirely due to the Special Committee's
diligent efforts and not to any litigation threat posed by the plaintiffs").
iRs. Id. at *1.
189. See David Marcus, Lynch Mob, THE DEAL, June 20, 2005, at 19 ("By reducing the plaintiffs'
lawyers' fees so drastically [in Cox], Strine may have ensured a reduced load of such cases
for the Court of Chancery, as plaintiffs' lawyers will look elsewhere for generous judges.").
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uncertainty from the controller's perspective, which, in turn, would deter
value-increasing freezeouts.
Of course, the Delaware courts need not entertain these second-order
policy arguments in determining the appropriate level of fees in Cox or other
freezeout transactions. But to the extent that the courts' objective in
formulating freezeout doctrine is to facilitate value-increasing transactions, it is
important to recognize that the reduction of fees may work in the opposite
direction. Under the present regime, the empirical evidence indicates that
litigation costs are unlikely to have a significant deterrent effect on merger-
freezeout activity. In an alternative regime in which fairness actions involving
Delaware freezeout targets are regularly brought in California or New York, for
example, the deterrent effect may be larger.
Rather than mount a frontal attack on fees, the better approach would be to
recalibrate standards of judicial review, as proposed in Part III of this Article.
Indeed, in dicta, the Cox Communications court endorsed elements of the
proposal put forward here and by Gilson and Gordon in their recommended
approach to freezeouts."9 °
C. The Absence of a Private Solution
I now turn to the question of whether and to what extent the efficiency
losses identified in this Part are avoidable through private contracting between
the controller and the minority. The structure of corporate law in the United
States has evolved from a regime of largely mandatory rules to a regime of
largely default rules that may be modified through the corporate charter. 91 In
many areas of corporate law, then, the controller and the minority have the
ability to contract around the default provisions if these provisions are
inefficient, unclear, or both.
Surprisingly, the efficiency losses identified in this Part seem to be an
exception to this general approach. On merger-freezeout doctrine, the
efficiency loss arises primarily from the SC's power to block the deal, which is
mandated by the Weinberger-to-Lynch line of cases and cannot be avoided
through private contracting. On tender-offer-freezeout doctrine, a potential
solution would be to amend the corporate charter: for example, the charter
could mandate the payment of fair value in any freezeout transaction, as
determined in a judicial proceeding or by an arbitrator, thereby disconnecting
19o. See In re Cox Commc'ns, 2005 WL 2001310, at *34-38.
191. See ALLEN & KRAAKmAN, supra note 29, at 86-88.
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the freezeout price from the market price. 9 ' This charter term would not apply
to the tender offer itself, because a tender offer does not require corporate
action and therefore is not subject to any restrictions that the charter might
impose. But in order to complete a tender offer freezeout a controller must use
the short-form merger statute. The short-form merger constitutes corporate
action, which therefore would be subject to a corporate charter provision
mandating a particular valuation process or formula.
The problem with this analysis is that the minority's exclusive remedy in a
short-form merger is appraisal, not entire fairness. 93 As discussed in
Subsection II.A.i above, this remedy imposes significant procedural and
substantive hurdles on minority shareholders that make it an ineffective
backstop against opportunistic tender offers. As a result, this private solution
would be unlikely to solve the efficiency loss identified in this Part.
Another potential private solution would be through a so-called standstill
agreement, in which the controller would be unable to increase its stake
without the target board's approval. 94 In effect, a controller would relinquish
its right to execute a tender offer freezeout through the standstill. The problem
with this approach, however, is that it goes too far. By forcing the controller to
go through the merger route, the SC would gain veto power over the deal
which would reintroduce the problem of blocked deals described in Subsection
II.B.i.a above.
II. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Part II identifies an efficiency loss inherent in existing freezeout doctrine.
The most important source of the efficiency loss arises from tender-offer-
freezeout doctrine, as it has developed through Siliconix and Glassman. A
secondary, but still important, efficiency loss arises from merger-freezeout
doctrine as it has developed through Weinberger and Lynch. Because these
social welfare losses are unlikely to be resolved through private contracting,
they are likely to persist until the judiciary intervenes. In this Part, I propose
such an intervention.
In contrast to prior commentators, who have generally taken a patchwork
approach to freezeout doctrine, I propose a doctrinal recalibration that is
grounded in first principles of corporate law. This grounding would reduce
192. See Coates, supra note 18, at 1288-89 (identifying this possibility).
193. See Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp. (In re Unocal Exploration Corp. S'holders Litig.),
777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
194- Cf. Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 621,
659-62 (2003) (noting the role of standstill agreements in arms-length acquisitions).
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perceptions of arbitrariness, increase doctrinal coherence, and limit possibilities
for future (and currently unforeseen) transactional arbitrage that might again
create an efficiency loss.
A. First Principles of Corporate Law
1. The Arms-Length Approach to Fundamental Transactions
In arms-length transactions, the general approach for consummating a
merger or acquisition requires two stages of approval: first, approval by the
target board; and second, approval by the target shareholders.' 9 Tender offers
might be considered an exception to this general approach because a bidder, at
least in theory, can bypass the board and make a tender offer directly to target
shareholders. However, in practice, the poison pill makes board approval a
prerequisite even for tender offers.19 6 And on the second step of shareholder
approval, the Delaware corporate code requires approval from a majority of the
shares outstanding in a merger'97 and approval from a majority of shares
outstanding (in the form of shares tendered) in a tender offer. Therefore, in the
modern (post-pill) world, we have parity between tender offers and mergers in
both stages of the approval process.19'
For a deal that has received both board approval and shareholder approval,
the standard of judicial review for the transaction turns on whether there is a
"sale of control." Deals in which shareholders lose their governance rights - for
example, an acquisition for cash-clearly constitute a sale of control and
therefore trigger enhanced scrutiny under Revlon.'99 When Revlon duties apply,
the target board of directors has the burden of showing that it maximized
immediate value for its shareholders.2 0 Other deals-for example, part-cash,
part-stock deals - may or may not trigger Revlon duties."°' The Delaware courts
195. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 251 (2001).
196. See Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 113, at 907-08.
197. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2oo1).
198. See Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1043-44 (2002)
(noting that the pill provides the board a role in responding to unsolicited tender offers).
19g. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 5o6 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
2oo. See Guhan Subramanian, The Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon Transactions, 28 J. CORP.
L. 691, 699 & n.52 (2003).
zoi. See, e.g., In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S'holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 70-71 (Del. 1995) (holding
that a transaction in which 33% of shares are acquired for cash does not trigger Revlon); In re
Lukens Inc. S'holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 732 n.25 (Del. Ch. 1999) (holding that a merger in
which the consideration was 62% cash likely triggers Revlon); see also Equity-Linked
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have held that freezeouts do not trigger Revlon duties, for the simple reason
that minority shareholders in a controlled company do not have control to
begin with.202
If a deal receives both board approval and shareholder approval and is not
subject to Revlon duties, the business judgment rule will protect the transaction
from judicial review. The recent case of Klein v. Roslyn Bancorp20 3 illustrates the
degree to which courts will defer to the board and approving shareholders in
this scenario. Roslyn involved the arms-length merger between Roslyn Bancorp
and New York Community Bancorp in June 2003. The boards of Rosyln and
New York Community had both approved the stock-for-stock merger, in
which each share of Roslyn would be exchanged for 0.75 newly issued shares of
New York Community.2 "4 Roslyn shareholders subsequently approved the
deal, even though it represented only a 3.2% premium when it was announced
and a negative premium by the time the deal closed. 05 Plaintiffs were former
Roslyn shareholders, who claimed that the Roslyn directors had breached their
fiduciary duty in approving the merger with New York Community at too low
of a price. A New York state court, applying Delaware law, dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim "in light of the long standing principles of
the Business Judgment Rule. ",,, 6 Despite the unusually low price, the court
refused to second-guess a deal that had been approved by a disinterested target
board and a majority of its shareholders.
The conceptual underpinnings for this two-stage approach can be found in
the different roles that board approval and shareholder approval play. A target
board (or, in practice, one or a few of its members) can negotiate with the
acquirer. If the parties negotiate effectively, they will explore various options,
assess tradeoffs across issues, and make offers and counteroffers, thus
identifying a fair range for the deal.2 7 In this multiround, repeated interaction,
the target and acquirer allocate the surplus. Target shareholders then make a
single "binary choice" on a take-it-or-leave-it offer presented to them by their
board. While this choice serves as a useful check on a disloyal or complacent
board, it is not of the same quality as a negotiation with the acquirer. In
Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1O55 (Del. Ch. 1997) ("How this 'change in control'
trigger works in instances of mixed cash and stock or other paper awaits future cases.").
zoz. See Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 306-07 (Del. Ch. 1994); Freedman v. Rest. Assocs.
Indus., Inc., No. Civ. A. 9212651, 1987 WL 14323 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987).
203. No. o16055, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 6, 2004) (on file with author).
2o4. See id., slip op. at 2.
205. See id., slip op. at 2-3.
206. Id., slip op. at 8.
207. See BAzERMAN & NEALE, supra note 149, at 67-76.
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particular, the threat of a withheld tender by minority shareholders might be
effective against grossly inadequate offers but may not be effective in providing
more than the low end of the bargaining range -much less a "fair" price.2"'
Although the basic approval process in the arms-length arena requires two
stages, there is a way around the first step of board approval. For the past thirty
years, the Delaware courts have assiduously protected the right of target
shareholders to elect directors,' 9 who must then be able to act with a free hand
in the management and oversight of the company." ' The ability to run a proxy
contest to replace the target board gives an acquirer a way to go around an
incumbent board's determination of inadequacy. By extension it means that
the target board does not have an unfettered right to resist a takeover; rather,
in the arms-length arena, this veto right is constrained by the ability of target
shareholders to elect a new board.
Admittedly, this end-run around the target board may not always be viable.
A proxy contest can cost millions of dollars, which is not reimbursed unless the
insurgent is successful. 1' In addition, when the target board is staggered, a
potential acquirer needs to run not one but two proxy contests, spaced as long
as thirteen months apart, in order to replace a majority of the target-board
directors. Bebchuk, Coates, and I have presented empirical evidence indicating
that this is an extremely difficult route. 12 But this finding does not change the
basic point that no board, including a board that is staggered, has an absolute
veto right against a controller. Rather, if the acquirer can gain sufficient
support from target shareholders and is sufficiently patient, it can override a
target-board veto to proceed to the second step (shareholder approval) in an
arms-length deal.2"
Thus, the picture we have from the arms-length arena can be characterized
as follows: substantial, but not unfettered, discretion for a target board to
2o. Cf. Wolfe, supra note 74, at 8 (describing the procedural hurdles of the SC and MOM
condition as "the difference that distinguishes a Swiss Army knife from a meat ax"). I thank
Vice Chancellor Leo Strine for helpful conversations on this point.
209. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas
Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
210. See Quickturn Design Sys. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998) (invalidating slow hand
pill); Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 118o (Del. Ch. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss
claim that dead hand pill is invalid).
211. See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955).
212. See Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 113, at 927-29.
213. See, e.g., Jim Carlton & Robin Sidel, Willamette Agrees To Be Bought by Weyerhaeuser, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 22, 2002, at A3 (noting that Weyerhaeuser was successful after a fourteen-month
hostile bid effort against Willamette, which had a poison pill and an effective staggered
board).
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negotiate with an acquirer, followed by a shareholder vote as a final check on
the deal. Of course, neither of these procedural protections is directly available
in the freezeout arena, because the acquirer controls both the target board and
the target shareholder vote. But the Delaware courts have urged procedural
protections in the freezeout context that invoke features of the arms-length
process. Weinberger's insistence on an SC of independent directors,214 Lynch's
focus on the SC's "power to say no,"21 and Pure Resources's promotion of a
MOM condition ,6 can all be seen as manifestations of this approach.
2. Application to Freezeout Doctrine
While Delaware courts have drawn comparisons between procedural
protections in freezeouts and the two steps of the arms-length approach, they
have never made the features of the arms-length approach the basis for
assessing the procedural protections in freezeouts.217 As a result, current
freezeout doctrine falls short of the arms-length standard for both tender offer
freezeouts and merger freezeouts. Specifically, tender-offer-freezeout doctrine
is deficient with respect to the first step of the arms-length standard (board
approval), while merger-freezeout doctrine is deficient with respect to the
second step of the arms-length standard (shareholder approval). I describe
these two points in more detail in the remainder of this Subsection.
a. Tender Offer Freezeouts
The deficiency in tender-offer-freezeout doctrine is easy to understand: As
demonstrated by empirical evidence as well as practitioner commentary, SCs
lack adequate bargaining power against a controlling shareholder. This fact
minimizes the first-stage negotiation that is so critical in the arms-length arena
for ensuring an adequate price. In fact, some practitioner commentary suggests
that too much back-and-forth with the SC in a tender offer freezeout may
cause a future Delaware court to find "board action" that would eliminate the
safe harbor provided by Siliconix and trigger entire fairness review. 8 The
214. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983).
215. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., 638 A.2d 111o, 1119 (Del. 1994).
21M6. See In re Pure Res., Inc. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002).
217. Recent opinions nevertheless indicate that the Delaware courts may be receptive to the
arms-length analogy. See, e.g., In re Cysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 549 n.23 (Del.
Ch. 2003); In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 444 n.43.
218. See Nathan & Schwartzbaum, supra note 97, at ii. The irony of this point is worth noting:
While merger-freezeout doctrine relies heavily (perhaps excessively) on the SC as a
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result is that SCs in tender offer freezeouts typically play a minimal role,
consisting of making 14 D-9 recommendations to minority shareholders on
offers that have been predetermined, or at least largely determined, by the
controller.
b. Merger Freezeouts
In contrast to tender-offer-freezeout doctrine, merger-freezeout doctrine
falls short on the second step of the arms-length process, approval from
disinterested shareholders. Only one-third of post-Siliconix merger freezeouts
included a MOM condition.219 In the remaining two-thirds of merger
freezeouts, minority shareholders received no opportunity to express a view on
the transaction because the controller can (and does) simply vote its stake in
favor of the deal. The reason stems from Rosenblatt: Because a controller
receives no incremental benefit in terms of judicial scrutiny from including a
MOM condition after the SC has approved the deal (either or both of these
protections merely shift the burden on entire fairness review), most controllers
do not provide a MOM condition to the minority.22 ° Contrast this outcome to
the arms-length process, which always requires shareholder approval in the
form of a merger vote or tendered shares.
MOM conditions serve two critical purposes in freezeouts. First, they
provide a final check through a binary choice on a board recommendation, as
described in the arms-length context above. Second, and unique to the
freezeout context, a MOM condition implicitly subjects the controller's offer to
a "market check.""2 1 For example, take a 6o% controlling shareholder who
negotiates a freezeout merger with an SC of independent directors, at $1o cash
per share. Without a MOM condition, the deal is finalized at this point: The
target board will recommend the deal to its shareholders, and the controller
will vote its 6o% stake in favor of the deal. In contrast, with a MOM condition,
there is the possibility of a "deal jumper" who can offer more. Consider a third-
party T who is willing to pay $12 cash for all shares. After the announcement of
the merger, and before the shareholder vote required by the MOM condition,
T can announce a tender offer for the minority shares at $12 per share.
Minority shareholders now face a choice between voting in favor of a merger in
which they will receive $1o per share, or tendering to T at $12. The outcome is
bargaining agent for the minority shareholders, tender-offer-freezeout doctrine has evolved
in a manner that actually discourages the SC from acting as a bargaining agent.
219. See Subramanian, supra note 18, at 44 fig.l.
220. See supra Subsection I.B.3.
221. See CLARK, supra note 118, § 12.3, at 518.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
not difficult to predict. If the controller nevertheless persists, T can block the
deal by voting its newly acquired majority-of-the-minority stake against it. The
controller will then be forced to either buy out T, presumably at more than $12
per share, or sell its stake to T as well.
In short, a MOM condition can facilitate an implicit market check in a
merger freezeout, and, in fact, is the only way to subject a merger freezeout to a
market check. This is because a controlling shareholder cannot be compelled to
sell its shares to a higher-value bidder (or anyone else)," 2 and the Delaware
courts have held that a merger freezeout does not trigger Revlon duties, which
would require the SC to facilitate and possibly even seek out competing bids.3
Instead, the vast majority of controlling shareholders indicate in their initial
approach to the target that they are not interested in selling to a competing
bidder.2 4 As a result, the SC typically cannot develop options away from the
table, which are often considered to be an important source of bargaining
power in negotiations generally. " 5
222. See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987).
223. See supra note 202.
224. See, e.g., ARV Assisted Living, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 4 (Sept. 24, 2002)
(noting that controlling shareholder Prometheus "stated that it is not interested in selling its
shares in ARV"); Letter from William J. Hannigan, Chairman and CEO, Sabre Holdings
Corp., to F. William Conner, Chairman of the Special Comm., Travelocity.com, Inc. (Feb.
20, 2002), reprinted in Travelocity.com, Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement
(Schedule 14D-9), at 23 (Mar. 5, 2002) ("[R]egardless of the outcome of our tender offer,
we have no intention of selling any of our equity interests in Travelocity.com ... , nor are
we willing to explore the possibility of another party making an investment in
Travelocity.com .... "); Press Release, Minuteman Int'l, Inc. (Apr. 5, 2004), reprinted in
Minuteman Int'l, Inc., Tender Offer Statement (Schedule TO), at Exhibit 99.1 (Apr. 5,
2004) ("Hako-Werke International [the controller] stated in its letter that it is not willing to
consider any alternative transaction in which it would sell any of the common stock of
Minuteman beneficially owned by it to a third party, or that would diminish in any way its
ownership interest in Minuteman."); see also Expedia, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at
28 (Oct. 11, 2002) (noting that "because IAC controls approximately 94.9% of the total
voting power of Expedia shares, and does not intend to sell its Expedia shares, the
possibility of a third party offer to acquire Expedia at a premium is minimal and cannot
occur without the consent of IAC"). But see Press Release, Westerbeke Corp., Westerbeke
Announces Agreement for $3.00 Per Share Cash Merger (May 5, 2003), reprinted in
Westerbeke Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Exhibit 99.1 (May 5, 2003) ("Pursuant to
the terms of the merger agreement, Westerbeke is free to seek and consider acquisition
proposals for the sale or merger of Westerbeke through June 12, 2003.... In the event that
the merger agreement is terminated to accept a third party proposal or under certain other
circumstances, Westerbeke has agreed to pay expenses of up to $75,000 to Mr.
Westerbeke.").
225. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GET'rING TO YES 97-106 (2d ed. 1991) (noting that developing
options away from the table is generally an important source of bargaining power in
negotiations).




The comparison between the arms-length process and the freezeout process
illuminates the ways in which freezeout doctrine should be reformed. The
target of my proposal is the judiciary, because the Delaware legislature is
unlikely to act in this arena anytime soon. The principal lever is the application
of entire fairness review rather than business judgment review. Fairness review
is a judicial (not statutory) construct, and therefore can be shaped with a
relatively free hand by the Delaware courts. The central claim in the remainder
of this Article is that courts should assess the extent to which the freezeout
negotiation process emulates both prongs of the arms-length deal process -
namely, disinterested board approval and disinterested shareholder approval.
When a freezeout process provides both of these procedural safeguards, a court
should apply business judgment review, regardless of the transactional form
that is used. Conversely, when the process does not include these procedural
safeguards, a court should apply entire fairness review.
The objective, then, is to construct a more tailored application of standards
of judicial review that is sensitive to specific procedural choices that the
controller and the SC make. If properly constructed, the system of standards of
review would create incentives for controllers to provide adequate procedural
protections to the minority, regardless of the transactional form used. These
procedural protections would eliminate the efficiency loss identified in Part II.
In the remainder of this Article, I describe the details that follow from this
overall approach.
B. Reforming Tender-Offer-Freezeout Doctrine
1. Increasing Special Committee Bargaining Power
On tender-offer-freezeout doctrine, the objective is to increase SC
bargaining power so as to emulate the board approval step in an arms-length
transaction. Providing SCs with meaningful bargaining power would reinsert a
well-informed committee on the other side of the negotiation process in tender
offer freezeouts. This would reduce the information asymmetry between the
parties at the table, which, in turn, would reduce the controller's ability to
engage in the socially inefficient opportunistic behavior described in the
previous Part.
There are two ways in which SC bargaining power might be increased: by
constructing standards of judicial review that encourage SC approval, or by
mandating the SC's use of a poison pill against the controller. In this Part, I
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examine these two approaches and conclude that adjusting standards of
judicial review is preferable to the private solution of a pill.
a. Through Standards ofjudicial Review
Increasing SC bargaining power through standards of judicial review
would require a reconsideration, in part, of Siliconix. The critical departure
from existing doctrine is that a tender offer freezeout that does not receive
affirmative SC approval should be subject to entire fairness review rather than
simply business judgment review. 6 As a result, and in contrast to the current
regime, the SC in a tender offer freezeout would have something to give (or
withhold)- namely, judicial deference to the offer price. The new bargaining
process, conducted in the shadow of a judicial determination of entire fairness,
would detach the price paid to the minority from the prevailing market price,
by allowing other, nonpublic, factors to enter into the negotiation. This would
reduce incentives for the controller to respond to, or create, discrepancies
between intrinsic value and market price.
Although the proposed approach might seem to increase litigation costs
because of the new potential for entire fairness review in tender offer
freezeouts, the actual cost increase may be zero in a dynamic framework
because controllers could avoid entire fairness review by reaching an agreement
with the SC. This point highlights another benefit of the proposed approach
over other, more simplistic, approaches. Under current doctrine, no party
engages in a fair price determination in a tender offer freezeout. In simplistic
proposals for reform, courts should engage in a determination of entire
fairness, with all of the attendant difficulties of judicial valuation proceedings.
In contrast, the approach outlined here allows the SC and the controller to
make a fairness determination together. While both of these parties will of
course be biased, the biases are in opposite directions and should cancel out, at
least in part, through the give and take of a meaningful negotiation. Therefore,
not only would this approach avoid the administrative costs of a fairness
az6. The requirement of affirmative approval means that "no recommendation" would trigger
entire fairness review. Gilson and Gordon make the same proposal in the tender-offer-
freezeout context. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 81, at 839-40. They reach their
conclusion, however, through a different efficiency objective -namely, balancing the
benefits of better monitoring that a controller provides in the context of the manager-
shareholder relationship against the costs of private benefit extraction that arise in the
controller-minority relationship. See id. at 785-86. The problem with this approach is that
there is no "fundamental truth" in the pre-Siliconix/Glassman array of rules that would
suggest that a deviation from this configuration must represent a social welfare loss.
Nevertheless, the fact that commentators using different analytical lenses can arrive at the
same policy conclusion suggests the robustness of the proposed reforms.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
115:2 2005
FIXING FREEZEOUTS
determination by the court, it would also lead to a more accurate fairness
determination than a court could provide.
b. Through Ability To Deploy a Pill
Instead of adjusting standards of judicial review, courts could enhance SC
bargaining power by requiring SCs to adopt poison pills against controlling
shareholders in tender-offer-freezeout negotiations. 7 The Delaware Chancery
Court has recently confirmed that SCs may adopt a pill against a controller;,
8
some commentators go further to suggest that the SC should seek, and the
target board should be required to give, the ability to block the bid at least
temporarily through a pill. 9 This expansion was considered and rejected in
Pure Resources itself, though Vice Chancellor Strine noted in his opinion the
"analytical and normative appeal" of such an approach.23 As of May 2005, an
SC has adopted a pill against a controller only once, in ICN Pharmaceutical's
June 2003 freezeout tender offer for the remaining 19.9% interest in
Ribapharm. This move yielded a 12% increase over ICN's initial offer,
consistent with the goal of increasing SC bargaining power in tender offer
freezeouts.
The problem with this alternative is that a pill might either go too far, or
not far enough, in providing SC bargaining power. First, too far: A pill might
give an SC absolute veto power that might then deter some efficient freezeouts,
for the reasons described in the analysis of merger-freezeout doctrine.23' On its
face, a pill would seem to give this veto power because a pill is generally
regarded as a "show stopper" against potential acquirers, including, if
structured correctly, a controlling shareholder.2 32 If the controller has veto
227. A "poison pill," more formally known as a shareholder rights' plan, is a warrant that gives
all shareholders the right to buy shares at a substantially discounted price in the event that
any individual or entity acquires more than a certain percentage of the target's stock,
typically between io% and 20%. The pill's bite comes from the fact that the entity that
triggers the pill loses its right to buy shares; therefore, triggering the pill severely dilutes the
bidder's stake, as all other shareholders exercise their deep-in-the-money options.
228. See Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, lO88-89 (Del. Ch. 2004), affd, 872 A.2d 559
(Del. 2005); Transcript of Oral Argument and Ruling of the Court at 72-81, Creo Inc. v.
Printcafe Software, Inc., Civ. A. No. 20184 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2003) (Chandler, C.) (on file
with author).
229. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 81, at 830-31, 839 (advocating the time-limited Interco pill).
230. See In re Pure Res., Inc. S'holders Litig., 8o8 A.2d 421, 446 (Del. Ch. 2002).
231. See supra Subsection II.B.i.a.
232. Recent commentators have argued that the pill is not in fact a "show-stopper" against an
arms-length acquirer. See William J. Carney & Leonard A. Silverstein, The Illusory Protections
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power over the transaction (through its ability to rescind its offer) and the SC
has veto power (through a pill), the predicted outcome will be determined by
their relative bargaining power rather than in the shadow of entire fairness
review. An SC may use its bargaining power to attempt to extract all of the
synergies (or more), which would then deter potentially efficient freezeouts.
Alternatively, the pill might not go far enough. Because the controller
typically controls the target's board, it might rescind the pill over the objection
of an obstinate SC and then proceed unilaterally with its tender offer to the
minority. There has not been sufficient experience with pills in the context of
controlled companies to know whether a controller could or would do this.233
But the unclear legal rules that would govern this sort of maneuvering suggest
that a pill deployed by an SC might be mere window dressing, to be pulled by
the controller at the moment the SC puts up a fight.
To summarize, there is no conceptual reason to believe that the ability to
deploy a pill would achieve the socially optimal outcome. Even the direction of
the error is ambiguous, given the absence of case law on the use of pills in the
freezeout context. This is not to say that a pill might not be useful for an SC to
demand- and a target board to give- in some contexts. But the analysis in this
Section suggests that the better approach in bolstering SC bargaining power in
freezeout tender offers is through adjustments to standards of judicial review.
The ability to deploy a pill should continue to be a matter of negotiation
between the SC and the target board, and not a matter of fiduciary duty
imposed by the courts.2 4
of the Poison Pill, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 179, 188-89 (2003). This argument only holds for
low pill-trigger thresholds, where the total dilution of the potential acquirer is relatively
small. In the freezeout context, the trigger threshold would have to be extremely high, for
the simple reason that the potential acquirer already holds a controlling stake. In this
context, the total dilution would be quite large; by extension, the pill is far more likely to be
a showstopper in this context.
233. The closest example is the recent attempt to sell control of Hollinger, in which the infamous
Lord Conrad Black did not control the board himself but had the ability to replace the board
through his control of the voting shares. Black threatened to use this power if the Hollinger
board adopted a poison pill. See Transcript of Record at 43, Hollinger Int'l, 844 A.2d 1022
(C.A. No. 183-N).
234. Gilson and Gordon suggest that an SC should have the right to adopt a "time-limited"
Interco pill, defined as a pill that "allows management time to secure an alternative
transaction and persuade shareholders that the price bid is too low, but does not allow
management ultimately to block the offer." Gilson & Gordon, supra note 81, at 830-31 &
n.181 (citing Ronald J. Gilson, Lipton & Rowe's Apologia for Delaware: A Short Reply, 27 DEL.
J. CORP. LAW 37, 47 (2002)). The problem with this approach is that the SC's ability to seek
out an alternative transaction is severely limited by the controller's right to not sell. See supra
text accompanying notes 223-225. In fact, most controlling shareholders explicitly disavow
the possibility of a sale to a third party. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. And
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2. Promoting Majority-of-the-Minority Conditions
SC approval should be a necessary but not sufficient condition for business
judgment review of tender offer freezeouts. Following Pure Resources, an offer
should be deemed noncoercive only if it includes a MOM condition as well.23
When the freezeout includes meaningful SC approval and a MOM condition, it
resembles an arms-length deal and therefore should receive minimal scrutiny
from the courts. Any deviation from this blueprint - SC approval without a
MOM condition, or a MOM condition without SC approval-does not look
like an arms-length process and, therefore, should trigger entire fairness
review. This insistence on a two-stage approval process emphasizes the point
that SC approval and a MOM condition are not substitutes for each other;
rather, as explained above, the SC's function is to bargain vigorously with the
controller, while a MOM condition can provide only a final check through the
binary choice of minority shareholder approval.236
While Pure Resources indicates that a tender offer freezeout will be subject
to entire fairness review, not business judgment review, unless it includes a
nonwaivable MOM condition, the decision does not make clear who would
have the burden in the scenario in which the SC rejects the deal but the
controller nevertheless gets MOM approval. If the burden remained with the
defendant in this scenario, then a controller would have no incentive to provide
a MOM condition if the SC withheld its approval. In order to create such an
incentive, I propose extending the rule articulated in the merger-freezeout
context 37 to tender offers: A MOM condition, even without SC approval, will
shift the burden to the plaintiff. This means that a controller who goes around
the SC would have an incentive to nevertheless include a MOM condition in
order to achieve burden-shifting on entire fairness.
3. The Influence of Sarbanes-Oxley and Stock Exchange Listing
Requirements
One concern with these proposed reforms is that they might trigger
fairness review where current doctrine does not, in instances when a controller
has complied with the full set of procedural protections that are available to it.
This would happen when a target board has no independent directors, and,
among those that do not explicitly make this point to the SC in its initial offer, most would
likely reject a third-party offer if one were to materialize.
235. See In re Pure Res., 8o8 A.2d at 445.
236. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
237. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985).
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therefore, cannot form an SC to negotiate with the controller. In my sample of
post-Siliconix freezeouts, I find four such transactions out of thirty-five tender
offer freezeouts.23 s Under existing doctrine, these transactions were subject
only to business judgment review by the court. 39 In contrast, under the
reforms proposed in this Part, these transactions would have been subject to
entire fairness review due to the absence of SC approval.
Fortunately, this problem will not exist under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
the new stock exchange listing requirements. While companies with a
controlling shareholder are exempt from the requirement that a majority of the
directors be independent,'40 all publicly traded companies, including controlled
companies, must have a completely independent audit committee. 4 ' Therefore,
under current corporate governance rules, all target companies will have the
ability to form an SC, which means that corporate law should draw a negative
inference in situations where an SC is not formed. This inference is built into
the reforms proposed above, in that a controller cannot get business judgment
review for the transaction if an SC is not formed. The converse of this point is
equally important: The proposed reforms give a controller substantial
incentives to form an SC, because this is the only way to avoid entire fairness
review by the courts.
C. Reforming Merger-Freezeout Doctrine
1. Promoting Majority-of-the-Minority Conditions
My principal proposal for merger-freezeout doctrine seeks to promote
MOM conditions in addition to an SC process in order to emulate both prongs
of arms-length negotiations, namely, disinterested board approval and
disinterested shareholder approval. Under current doctrine, either an SC
process or a MOM condition shifts the burden on entire fairness review from
defendant to plaintiff. My proposed addition is that the combination of an SC
process and a MOM condition should shift the standard of judicial review from
238. See Subramanian, supra note 18, at 45 fig.2. All four of these deals were subject to a MOM
condition.
239. See In re Aquila, Inc. S'holders Litig., 805 A.2d 184 (Del. Ch. 2002).
24o. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 3o3A.oo (2004), available at
http://www.nyse.com/cm.
241. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 3o1(3)(A), ui6 Stat. 745, 776
(codified as amended at i U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2002)).
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entire fairness to business judgment review. "2 A merger-fteezeout process that
looks like an arms-length process - meaningful bargaining by the SC followed
by an informed vote of the minority shareholders -is not inherently suspect
and, therefore, should receive deference from the courts.
This refinement would have two effects. First, and most obviously, it
would increase the number of MOM conditions by creating doctrinal
incentives for the controller to provide a MOM condition to the minority. As
noted above, a MOM condition would provide an implicit market check on the
controller's offer to the minority. Second, and equally important, it would
minimize the application of fairness review, which would reduce administrative
costs.
This proposed refinement would not require a reconsideration of the
burden-shifting approach outlined in Lynch. An SC process or a MOM
condition would continue to shift the burden on entire fairness. The additional
layer proposed here is that the combination of an SC process and a MOM
condition would give the controller business judgment review by the court.
2. Bolstering the Tender Offer Threat
A second, more subtle, refinement to existing doctrine involves the court's
specific holding in Lynch, that threatening the SC with a tender offer to the
minority eliminates the SC's "ability to say no."2 3 Following the approach
described in Subsection III.A.1, the SC's veto power in a freezeout merger
negotiation should emulate a target board's veto power in an arms-length
merger, which is subject to a "proxy contest out." This means that a controller
should be able to resort to its otherwise legitimate walk-away alternative of a
tender offer directly to minority shareholders. By extension, a controller should
be able to threaten this route as a negotiating tactic at the table with the SC -a
reversal of the court's holding in Lynch.
Even under this proposed approach, certain threats may continue to be
impermissible. Consider, for example, a threat to proceed unilaterally with the
transaction -i.e., ignoring the SC, voting the deal through at the board level
w. Other commentators have also proposed expansions of business judgment review in the
freezeout arena, which amount to a carving back of the Weinberger-to-Lynch line of cases.
See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 49, at 13o6-o9 (proposing business judgment review if the
freezeout receives either SC approval or minority approval); Donald J. Wolfe, Jr., The
Special Negotiating Committee and the Business Judgment Rule: A Modest Proposal, M&A LAw.,
Apr. 2002, at i (proposing business judgment review if the freezeout receives SC approval);
Steven M. Haas, Note, Toward a Controlling Shareholder Safe Harbor, 9o VA. L. REV. 2245,
2272-75 (2004) (same).
243. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
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over the independent directors' objections, and then voting the deal through at
the shareholder level without a MOM condition.' This kind of threat should
continue to be impermissible under Lynch (meaning that the controller should
have the burden to demonstrate fairness) because it strips the SC of its veto
power, leaving no further check on the controller's actions.
The guiding principle for treating unilateral threats differently continues to
be the arms-length standard. In the arms-length context, a threat to go around
the target board still requires the approval of a majority of target shareholders
in the proxy contest-that is, there is no way for the buyer to unilaterally
acquire the target. Likewise, a threat to go around the SC in the freezeout
context must still be subjected to shareholder approval through the tender offer
route.
This refinement would complement the change on MOM conditions
proposed in the previous Subsection. If merger freezeouts will be increasingly
subjected to MOM conditions, because of the benefit of business judgment
review, then courts should be less determined to provide SCs with absolute
veto power. Taken together, the proposed approach to merger freezeouts
increases the procedural protection provided by MOM conditions and reduces
(slightly) the procedural protection provided by SC approval. The combination
more closely emulates the procedural protections that are inherent in the arms-
length merger process.
Bolstering the tender offer threat in merger freezeouts would not drive
prices in freezeout merger negotiations down toward market prices, as
described in Subsection II.B.i.b. The reason is that the threatened tender offer
would be subject to entire fairness review, due to the absence of SC approval.
Entire fairness review detaches the price paid from market prices, which, in
turn, reduces the incentives for inefficient opportunistic behavior by the
controller. Therefore, the threat of a tender offer provides a controller a second
opinion against an intransigent SC but would not allow the controller to pay a
lower price.
D. Synthesis
Figure 1 summarizes the standards of judicial review that would apply
according to the transaction structure and procedural protections that are
included in the deal. The most important departures from existing doctrine in
the application of entire fairness review (EFR) and business judgment review
244. For an example of this kind of threat, see American General Corp. v. Texas Air Corp., Nos.
Civ. A. 8390 et al., 1987 WL 6337 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1987), which involved the freezeout of
Continental Airlines's minority shareholders by Frank Lorenzo's Texas Air.
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(BJR) are shaded on the right side of the chart. For fairness review, the party
that has the burden of proof is indicated in parentheses.
Figure 1.
PROPOSED STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR FREEZEOUTS
SC APPROVAL SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL
PROPOSED CURRENT
NO > EFR (D) R(D
SEFR (P) EFR (D)






YES EF P J
NO




* Without a successful tender offer at this stage there is no transaction to be examined by the
courts.
While the details are somewhat complicated, the proposal can be
summarized with two simple points. First, a point on SC bargaining power:
While SCs should have meaningful bargaining power against the controller,
this bargaining power should be subject to the controller's right to proceed
directly to minority shareholders through a tender offer freezeout (overruling
aspects of Lynch). The controller should bear a cost, in terms of standards of
review, from going around the SC, but this cost should not be prohibitive.
Second, a point on standards of judicial review: SC approval and a MOM
condition should lead to business judgment review rather than entire fairness
(again, overruling aspects of Lynch); SC approval or a MOM condition should
shift the burden on entire fairness to the plaintiffs (following aspects of Lynch
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and Rosenblatt); and neither SC approval nor a MOM condition should trigger
entire fairness review by the courts, with the burden on the defendants
(overruling aspects of Siliconix).
One way to think about these proposed reforms is that courts should step
in to fill gaps, as needed, in the procedural protections that are provided to the
minority shareholders. So, for example, if a freezeout receives SC approval but
not minority shareholder approval, the court should review the transaction for
fairness, with the burden on the plaintiff, to fill the shoes of the minority
shareholders. Likewise if the SC does not approve the transaction but minority
shareholders do, the court should step in to fill the SC's shoes, again with the
burden on the plaintiff shareholders to show unfairness. If both the SC and
minority shareholders approve, there are no gaps to fill and so the court should
defer to the outcome of the process. '
These proposed reforms would increase efficiency in the freezeout context
in three important ways. First, by giving the SC meaningful bargaining power
in tender offer freezeouts, the proposed reforms would reduce the controller's
incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior and reduce (if not eliminate) the
controller's ability to use nonpublic information to the detriment of the
minority shareholders. Second, by softening the SC's unfettered veto power
and by promoting MOM conditions in merger freezeouts, the proposed
reforms would lower the procedural hurdles that currently deter some deals in
this category. Putting these points together, a final benefit of the proposed
reforms is convergence in the procedural protections provided to minority
shareholders across transactional forms. This harmonization should eliminate
the difference in freezeout outcomes and facilitate both transactional planning
and the accurate valuation of a minority stake.
E. Applications
Thus far I have described my proposed reforms on a theoretical level. To
see how these reforms might play out in real-world deals, I return to the two
freezeout cases described in the Introduction: the Cox sisters' freezeout of the
245. An important caveat is that business judgment review should not be invoked if the plaintiff
can (i) challenge the independence of the SC under the standard set forth in Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815-16 (Del. 1984), and more recently developed in In re Oracle Corp.
Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003); (2) undermine the validity of a MOM
vote by showing inadequate disclosure or coercion; or (3) plead with particularity that the
SC process was corrupted despite the facial independence of the SC. Cf. In re Cysive, Inc.
S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 549 T1.23 (Strine, V.C.) (2003) (suggesting that courts should
not apply the business judgment rule when the merger was the product of fiduciary
misconduct).
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minority shareholders of Cox Communications in late 2004; and News
Corporation's freezeout of the minority shareholders of Fox Entertainment
Group in early 2005. Both targets were incorporated in Delaware. Both targets
employed an SC of independent directors (three directors at Cox, two at Fox)
that eventually approved the deal, and both deals included a MOM condition
as a nonwaivable deal term. And, in the end, both deals were successful. But a
critical difference lies in their choice of transactional form: Cox was a merger
freezeout, while Fox was a tender offer freezeout. This difference allows an
illustration of the full spectrum of reforms proposed in this Article.
1. Cox Communications (August 2004)
Cox Enterprises Inc. (CEI), 98% owned by the Cox sisters, announced its
intention to freeze out the minority shareholders of Cox Communications Inc.
(CCI) on August 2, 2004. In its press release CEI made clear that it was
pursuing a merger freezeout, and that the CCI SC would have the ability to
veto the deal. 46 CEI offered $32 cash per share for the minority shares, a 16%
premium over the preannouncement trading price for CCI, or $7.9 billion in
total value. CCI formed an SC of the three directors on its board who were
independent from CEI: Janet Clarke (chair), President of Clarke Littlefield
LLC; Andrew Young, former mayor of Atlanta and former U.S. ambassador to
the United Nations; and Rodney Schrock, CEO of Panasas, Inc. 47 On August
17, the SC retained Goldman Sachs as its financial advisor and Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson as its legal advisor. On September 28, more than
seven weeks after CEI's initial offer, the SC responded that $32 per share was
inadequate and that "the Special Committee desired that CEI significantly
increase its proposal."" 8 CEI increased its offer to $33.50 as its "highest and
final offer." 49 A stalemate then followed that loomed dangerously close to an
impasse. Janet Clarke described her negotiations on October 15 with James
Kennedy, the CEO of CEI, as follows:
246. See Press Release, Cox Enters., supra note 2 ("CEI expects the Board of Directors of CCI to
form a special committee of independent directors to consider the proposal with the
assistance of outside financial and legal advisors and to negotiate the proposal with CEI.
Directors of CCI affiliated with CEI will not participate in the evaluation of the proposal,
which requires the approval of the special committee." (emphasis added)).
247. See Cox Commc'ns, Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement (Schedule 14-D9), at
Exhibit 99.1 (Aug. 10, 2004).
248. See Affidavit of Janet Clarke at 2-3, In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 613-
N, 2005 WL 2001310 (Del. Ch. Mar. 10, 2005) (on file with author).
249. Id.
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We stated that we had previously indicated that a $35 per Share price
would not be acceptable. Mr. Kennedy stated that $34.50 was CEI's
highest price and that CEI would withdraw its proposal if this price
were not acceptable to us .... [Later that day] I told Mr. Kennedy that
the Special Committee would not support a price lower than $35 per
Share. Mr. Kennedy again stated that he was not willing to increase
CEI's offer above $34.50 per Share and was prepared to immediately
withdraw CEI's proposal.
50
Note the way in which the shadow of merger-freezeout doctrine influenced
this negotiation."1 CEI's "final and best" offer of $34.50 represented a 25%
premium over the preannouncement price of CCI's minority shares, or $1.7
billion in aggregate additional value for the minority shareholders; yet at no
point in the negotiation did CEI (through its CEO Kennedy) threaten to take
its offer directly to the minority shareholders through a tender offer, likely due
to the insistence in Lynch of "playing nicely" with the SC.25 2 In addition, the
background legal rules forced CEI to negotiate with both the SC and Abbey
Gardy, chair of the plaintiffs' committee, because the SC could not, through its
approval, extinguish the plaintiffs' entire fairness claim.
On the SC's side, Clarke and her colleagues made full use of their veto
power, extending the negotiation for more than four months, and, in the end-
game, threatening to walk away from $1.7 billion in an effort to extract an extra
$123 million (50 cents per share) for the minority. In this case the
brinksmanship tactic worked, at least in part: CEI increased its offer by an
additional 25 cents per share, or $61 million, in order to reach an agreement
with the SC and with plaintiffs' counsel. But the standard agency cost concerns
that pervade so much of corporate law are at least lurking in the background
here. Clarke, Young, and Schrock each earned $75,000 per year as board
members of CCI, 3 and, as is normally the case, did not join the CEI board
after the freezeout 4 While this level of director compensation is well within
the acceptable limits for companies like Cox and is unlikely to have had a
significant influence on the SC's decision-making, it is clear that the financial
250. Id. at 3-4.
251. Cf Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (demonstrating how the "shadow of the law" provides
endowments that influence outcomes).
252. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
253. See Cox Commc'ns, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule I4A), at 12 (Apr. 5, 2004).
2S4. See Cox Commc'ns, Inc., Amendment No. ii (Schedule 13D/A), at Schedule I (Dec. 22,
2004) (listing members of Cox Enterprises board after the freezeout).
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incentives and other perquisites for the SC members created a structural
incentive against the deal, at least at the margin.
Consider the influence that the reforms proposed in this Article might have
had in the Cox situation. First, CEI would have had greater bargaining power
in the negotiation because it could have threatened to take its deal directly to
the minority shareholders -that is, CEI's walk-away alternative would have
been a tender offer freezeout rather than no deal. This subtle shift would
increase the likelihood that value-creating freezeouts would be realized because
the SC would be less likely to adopt brinksmanship tactics if it no longer had
unchecked veto power over the deal. Reasoning back, a controller would be
more likely to initiate a value-creating freezeout due to the reduced likelihood
that an intransigent SC would hold up the deal.
In situations where the controller actually made good on its threat to go to
minority shareholders over the objection of the SC, the minority would be
adequately protected through fairness review by the courts. The converse of
this point is also critical: The controller could extinguish the class action
fairness claim by gaining the SC's approval and subjecting the deal to a MOM
condition. As a result, the litigation costs that arise under current doctrine
would be reduced or eliminated.
What difference would these reforms have made in the Cox situation?
While any answer is of course speculative, one plausible scenario is that CEI
would have made $34.50 its true "final and best" offer, coupled with a tender
offer threat; in view of this credible threat the SC would have accepted the
$34.50 offer, conditional on MOM shareholder approval; and, after the MOM
vote, the transaction would have been subjected only to business judgment
review. Relative to the actual outcome, this hypothesized outcome would have
represented a transfer of $63 million (or 25 cents per share) from the minority
to the controller, and a transfer of $1.3 million (the size of the court-approved
attorneys' fee) from plaintiffs' counsel to the controller. More important than
these wealth transfers, efficiency improvements would have arisen from the
increased likelihood that controllers would initiate value-creating freezeouts
and the increased likelihood that such deals, once initiated, would be
successful.
2. Fox Entertainment Group Uanuaty 2005)
News Corporation's freezeout of the Fox Entertainment minority
shareholders illustrates the other set of reforms proposed in this Article. On
January 1O, 2005, News announced its initial offer of 1.9 News shares for each
Fox share, which represented a 7.4% premium over the preannouncement
trading price for Fox. While News CFO David DeVoe declared that the offer
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represented "full and fair value for the Fox shareholders,"2 s investors
immediately denounced the premium as "a little thin "12s6 and "a little bit
skinny."2sz Consistent with the theory developed in this Article,58 some
investors also claimed that News was acting opportunistically, freezing out the
Fox minority shareholders while Fox was in a "rough patch."" 9
From the outset, and in stark contrast to the Cox freezeout process, News
made clear its intention to go forward with its offer regardless of whether Fox
formed an SC, and, if an SC were formed, regardless of what the SC
recommended. 6' Despite this saber-rattling, just hours after the offer was
announced Fox formed an SC consisting of the two directors on its board who
were independent of News: Christos Cotsakos, former CEO of E*Trade, and
Peter Powers, a strategy consultant who headed his own firm. Within one
week the SC retained the Blackstone Group and Morgan Stanley as its financial
advisors, and Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett as its legal advisor. On January 21,
faced with the deadline for its initial 14D-9 filing, the SC stated that it was not
yet able to take a position on the offer. On February 25, the SC counteroffered
with a 2.25 exchange ratio for the Fox shares. On March 1, News indicated that
it "might be willing to increase its exchange ratio to 2.00 plus possibly a very
small additional increment if this would result in a favorable recommendation
by the Special Committee. "12 ' The next day the parties agreed on an exchange
ratio of 2.04 News shares for each Fox share. The agreement was announced
255. See News Corp., January Investor Conference Call (Jan. 1o, 2005) (statement of David
DeVoe, Chief Fin. Officer, News Corp.), reprinted in News Corp., Filing of Certain
Prospectuses and Communications in Connection with Business Corporation Transactions
(Form 425), at 9 (Jan. lo, 2ooS).
256. See id. at 13 (statement of David Meller, Sanders, Morris & Harris) ("The 7.4% premium
you announced this morning seems a little thin - no offense.").
257. See id. at 16 (statement of Scott Suprelli, Copper R Capital) ("I would echo the earlier
comment that the premium seems a little bit skinny, based on a number of factors....
[Based on comparable companies] you're looking at a price that's closer to $41 than the
current price offered.").
258. See supra Subsection I.A.2.a.
259. See News Corp., January Investor Conference Call, supra note 255, at 9 (Mike Gallant,
CIBC: "I was just wondering if you [could] comment [on] buying it now. [I]t's been pretty
well documented that the broadcast network is going through a rough patch; SPOT-TV is
in pretty tough shape. They're coming off a huge couple years on the filmed entertainment
side. So I'm just curious, again, just following-up on Rich Greenfield's question of why now
and not six to nine months when things settle out a little better on that front?" Dave Devoe:
"I don't think I really have a lot more to add to it.").
26o. See Letter from K. Rupert Murdoch to the Fox Entm't Group Bd. of Dirs., supra note ii.
z61. Fox Entm't Group, SolicitationVRecommendation Statement (Schedule 14D-9/A), at ii
(Mar. 7, 2005).
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on March 3, and the deal closed on March 22, less than eleven weeks after the
initial offer from News.
Note the difficult bargaining situation that confronted the Fox SC. It could
not hold up the deal; indeed, the tender offer was underway at the same time
that the SC was attempting to extract a higher price from News. Plaintiffs'
counsel, though present in this deal, had limited bargaining power as well
because the Siliconix precedent eliminated entire fairness review for the
transaction. Putting these points together, the Fox freezeout seems consistent
with the theory developed in this Article that the binding constraint on News's
final offer price was simply what the requisite fraction of the minority would
accept-a "binary choice" that would not necessarily reflect "fair value" in the
freezeout. Perhaps illustrating this point, the final premium paid to the Fox
minority shareholders was 8.4% lower than the premium paid in Cox. Put
differently, if the Fox minority had received the same premium as the Cox
minority, they would have achieved an additional $504 million in total
consideration from News.26 2
More important than this wealth transfer, however, are the efficiency
implications. Under the reforms proposed in this Article, the SC would have
had greater bargaining power because News would only be able to avoid entire
fairness review by gaining the SC's approval. As a result, News would want to
gain SC approval in order to minimize or eliminate settlement value for
plaintiffs' counsel. The implication is that at least one party with access to
nonpublic information about the value of Fox would have had meaningful
bargaining power against the controller: most likely the Fox SC, but
alternatively plaintiffs' counsel (through discovery) or the Delaware courts
(through a judicial determination on entire fairness). As a result, the incentives
for News to engage in opportunistic behavior (as was alleged), or to initiate
socially inefficient freezeouts, would be reduced, if not eliminated.
CONCLUSION
At its core, corporate law seeks to manage three basic relationships: between
shareholders and managers; between shareholders and other constituencies; and
262. If this analysis is correct, an obvious question is why CEI chose a merger-freezeout
structure. Indeed, one practitioner-oriented journal reported that some transactional lawyers
were "scratching their heads" over this question. See David Marcus, From Theory to Practice,
CORP. CONTROLALERT, Dec. 2004, at lo.
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between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.263 While most
corporate law commentary during the 198os and 199os focused on the first two of
these three fundamental relationships, considerable attention has shifted recently
to the third. This shift has occurred in response to the Delaware courts' decisions
in Siliconix and Glassman in the summer of 20Ol, as well as the increased
economic significance of freezeouts in the aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Despite the intensity of the debate on freezeout doctrine over the past four
years, the case for change has never been made clear. By identifying an efficiency
loss from existing doctrine, this Article makes the case for change. The current
tender-offer-freezeout mechanism facilitates some inefficient (value-destroying)
transactions by allowing the controller to exploit asymmetric information against
the minority. In addition, the merger-freezeout mechanism deters some efficient
(value-increasing) transactions because of the SC's veto power and the prospect
of entire fairness review. Put simply, tender-offer-freezeout doctrine goes too far,
and merger-freezeout doctrine does not go far enough, in facilitating freezeouts.
Unlike deficiencies in most other areas of corporate law doctrine, this efficiency
loss cannot be solved through private contracting between the controller and the
minority. Thus, one contribution of this Article is that it identifies why we
should try to fix freezeouts.
This Article then takes up the challenge. Rather than proposing a
patchwork solution, I propose a return to first principles of corporate law. At
the highest level, I propose that minority shareholders should receive, to the
extent possible, the same procedural protections that are built into the arms-
length merger process. In the freezeout context, this principle means approval
by an SC of disinterested directors, to be followed by approval from a majority
of the minority shareholders. If these procedural protections are met, courts
should defer to the outcome and apply only business judgment review. If these
procedural protections are not met, courts should step in to apply stringent
entire fairness review. These reforms, which do not require legislative
intervention, would reduce, if not eliminate, the efficiency loss that is inherent
in existing doctrine. The result would be a more efficient ordering of U.S.
companies between public and private status.
263. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Governance Structure, in REINIER
KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 33 (2004).
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